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Thesis Abstract 
Objectives: The evidence base for Acceptance and Commitment Therapy‘s 
(ACT) overall effectiveness is highly promising. However, the extent to which 
the six processes comprising ACT have been investigated is extremely variable. 
In particular, the process regarding the self and therapeutic change is in need of 
validation, having never been subjected to empirical investigation The objective 
of the present study was to achieve this by testing whether the predictions ACT 
makes regarding the self and therapeutic change are supported by quantitative 
data. The specific prediction to be tested were that a) those with a fixed sense 
of self and low psychological flexibility will display high therapeutic resistance 
and b) those with a fluid sense of self and high psychological flexibility will 
display a strong tendency towards value-based behaviour.   
Method: Data from 171 non-clinical participants was subjected to a two-way 
between subjects ANCOVA, with self-theory and psychological flexibility as 
independent variables and therapeutic reactance as the dependent variable, co-
varying out the effects of gender.  
Results: A significant interaction effect between psychological flexibility and 
sense of self was found. Post-hoc tests revealed two specific findings: Firstly, 
people with low psychological flexibility and a fixed sense of self displayed 
therapeutic reactance that was likely to impede therapeutic change. Secondly, 
people with high psychological flexibility and a fluid sense of self displayed 
therapeutic reactance that was more likely to be consistent with value-driven, 
goal-oriented behaviour.    
Conclusions: These findings are consistent with ACT‘s theorised process 
regarding the self and therapeutic change. Thus, ACT‘s predictions regarding 
the self and therapeutic change have received their first empirical validation. 
Clinically, the overarching psychotherapeutic focus is on the client‘s process of 
relating to their self-concept, rather than altering its contents.  
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I. JOURNAL ARTICLE 
This article is written in the form required for submission to The Journal of 
Social and Clinical Psychology, apart from when course guidelines stipulate 
differently. The guidelines provided by this journal may be found in Appendix A. 
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The self and psychotherapy: are the predictions ACT makes about self-as-
content accurate? 
The evidence base for Acceptance and Commitment Therapy‘s (ACT) overall 
effectiveness is highly promising. However, the extent to which the six processes 
comprising ACT have been investigated is extremely variable. In particular, the process 
regarding the self and therapeutic change is in need of validation, having never been 
subjected to empirical investigation The objective of the present study was to achieve 
this by testing whether the predictions ACT makes regarding the self and therapeutic 
change are supported by quantitative data. The specific predictions to be tested were 
that a) those with a fixed sense of self and low psychological flexibility will display high 
therapeutic resistance and b) those with a fluid sense of self and high psychological 
flexibility will display a strong tendency towards value-based behaviour. Data from 171 
non-clinical participants was subjected to a two-way between subjects ANCOVA, with 
self-theory and psychological flexibility as independent variables and therapeutic 
reactance as the dependent variable, co-varying out the effects of gender. A significant 
interaction effect between psychological flexibility and sense of self was found. Post-
hoc tests revealed two specific findings: Firstly, people with low psychological flexibility 
and a fixed sense of self displayed therapeutic reactance that was likely to impede 
therapeutic change. Secondly, people with high psychological flexibility and a fluid 
sense of self displayed therapeutic reactance that was more likely to be consistent with 
value-driven, goal-oriented behaviour. These findings are consistent with ACT‘s 
theorised process regarding the self and therapeutic change. Thus, ACT‘s predictions 
regarding the self and therapeutic change have received their first empirical validation. 
Clinically, the overarching psychotherapeutic focus is on the client‘s process of relating 
to their self-concept, rather than altering its contents 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is a form of psychotherapy 
defined by its function of fostering psychological flexibility (Luoma, Hayes & 
Walser, 2006). Psychological flexibility is defined as fully contacting the 
thoughts, feelings and other contents of the present moment without defence, 
and acting adaptively in it to achieve valued goals (McCracken & Vellerman, 
2010). Increasing psychological flexibility is equivalent to reducing experiential 
avoidance, which is the unwillingness to remain in contact with aversive 
thoughts, memories, images or emotions (Hayes et al., 2004). ACT‘s function is 
fulfilled through six interacting processes, represented by the ‗hexaflex‘ in 
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Figure 1. Each processes serves to increase psychological flexibility and reduce 
experiential avoidance.     
 
 
 
Repeated meta-analyses have found that, as an overall therapeutic package, 
ACT is potentially at least as effective as traditional cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & Lillis, (2006; Öst, 2008). However, 
within this overall model, the specific process regarding the self has never been 
empirically investigated. This is a particular oversight, as it is the fundamental 
theoretical position from which the model of ACT first sprang (Hayes, 1984). 
The lack of empirical investigation is even more surprising, given   Hayes et al.‘s 
(2006) recommendation that studies into each ACT process, are vital for 
validating the overall model.The current study seeks to fulfil this need by 
empirically testing whether the predictions that the ACT model makes about the 
self and therapeutic change are accurate.  it [See Extended Background 1.1. for 
a discussion of the ACT’s evidence base and 1.2 for the controversy in 
comparing ACT to Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT). Further discussion of 
behaviourism and the self is taken up in the Extended Discussion.]  
Increased 
Psychological 
Flexibility/Decreased 
experiential 
avoidance 
Figure 1: The ACT Hexaflex – six psychotherapeutic processes 
facilitating psychological flexibility (after Hayes et al, 1999). 
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The self and ACT 
The self as an object of study in psychology is defined as the cognitive and 
affective representation of oneself as the subject of experience, such a 
representation being vital in motivation and existence within society (Sedikes & 
Spencer, 2007). Ontologically, ACT regards the self as an ongoing action within 
a context rather than a separately existing entity: they are verbs rather than 
nouns (Hayes et al., 1999). Skinner (1974) provided an operational definition of 
self as the behaviour of verbally discriminating one‘s behaviour. That is, an 
individual‘s ability to know one‘s self. From a behavioural perspective the self 
exists as a mental experience; it does not exist as a mental entity. This avoids 
the need to posit the existence of a ‗homunculus,‘ a concept found to logically 
flawed (Kanter, Parker & Kohlenberg, 2001).  
Theories of the self within social and personality psychology do not tend to 
share this ontological position (Kanter et al., 2001). Instead, they often seek to 
define the self based on the assumption that there is an existing mental entity 
that is in need of definition (Lewis, 1992). Perhaps as a consequence of this 
assumption, there is wide disagreement about how the self should be defined, 
making it ―frustrating and difficult…for those who wish to come up with a 
meaningful picture of the self‖ (Brinthaupt & Lipka, 1992). The emphasis of 
social psychology approaches tend to be upon the cognitions and evaluations 
an individual has about themselves which provide the contents of their self-
concept. This has led to an emphasis on self-esteem as the major variable 
connecting the self to psychological well-being, the rationale being that 
increasing the positive valance of one‘s self-concept will reduce the propensity 
for psychological distress (Baumeister, 1999) [See Extended Background 1.3 
regarding the self from the perspective of social psychology].  
Because ACT does not define the self as a separately existing entity it 
constructs the connection between self and psychological wellbeing rather 
differently.  Instead, it equates increased psychological flexibility with increased 
mental health, this correlation being found consistently over a range of quality of 
life outcomes (see Hayes et al., 2006). A lack of psychological flexibility is 
increasingly being recognised as a core pathogenic process underlying diverse 
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forms of psychological distress (Gird & Zettle, 2009; Kashdan and Rottenberg, 
2010). How this relates to the self in ACT will now be discussed. [See Extended 
Background 1.3 for the role of psychological flexibility and experiential 
avoidance in human suffering].  
The self in ACT 
Within the connection between self and psychological flexibility, current ACT 
theory focuses on two senses of the self: self-as-context and self-as-content. 
Self-as-context is proposed to facilitate increased psychological flexibility and 
decreased experiential avoidance, whereas self-as-content is proposed to be an 
obstacle to them. Self-as-context will be briefly described in order to 
contextualise self-as-content, as defining one helps to define the other. 
[Extended Background 1.4 describes a third sense of self in ACT]  
Self-as-context. Self-as-context arises from perspective taking relations 
(e.g. ‗I‘ versus ‗You,‘ ‗Here‘ versus ‗There‘ or ‗Now‘ versus ‗Then‘) therefore 
defining the self in relation to the environment in which it exists (Hayes & 
Berens, 2004). These deictic relationships provide a perspective, or locus, 
(subject) from which the world (object) is perceived. This perspective provides a 
constant and stable place from which the outside world, which is inherently 
inconstant and unstable, can be experienced. It is this process of conscious 
experiencing, rather than the content of conscious experience, that supports 
self-as-context Indeed, the observing self cannot, by definition, be content or 
object or ‗thing‘ because for objects and things to exist they need to have 
perceivable boundaries; self-as-context, by contrast, is boundless (Hayes, 
1985). This being the case, it provides a standpoint from which content can be 
experienced without attachment or avoidance. As attachment and avoidance of 
desired or aversive content are seen to inhibit psychological flexibility, self-as-
context fosters psychological flexibility.  
Self-as-content. If self-as-context arises from the perspective from which 
phenomena are experienced, self-as-content arises from the specific content of 
that phenomena. This sense of self is also referred to as ‗self-as-concept,‘ 
(Luoma et al., 2006) or the ‗conceptualised self‘ (Hayes et al., 1999) within the 
literature. The current study seeks to investigate whether self-as-content 
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involves the properties that ACT and related literature theorise it to possess. If 
so, ACT‘s understanding of the self would gain empirical validation. If not, 
questions regarding this aspect of its theoretical framework would be raised. 
Either way, this study seeks clarification and greater understanding of this issue. 
Before the properties of self-as-content can be investigated, they must first be 
defined. Hayes et al. (1999) define the self-as-content as the product of verbal 
abilities. We use these verbal abilities to understand external events, and link 
them to other verbal knowledge to form a coherent picture. This picture is then 
presented to the social-verbal community, who affirm or deny whether it is 
correct. Their feedback leads to further modifications in order to attain 
correctness and consistency, attributes that are positively regarded. In order for 
our picture to remain coherent and correct, for it to keep making sense, we have 
a powerful cognitive propensity to distort the world around us so that it is 
consistent. The image of one‘s self that arises from this process is termed the 
self-as-content. Self-as-content must be consistent and coherent. To maintain 
such qualities, a tendency to ignore disconfirmatory and exaggerate 
confirmatory evidence is necessary.  
Identity and self-as-content 
ACT proposes that the extent to which we identify with self-as-content is more 
important than its content. Being strongly or weakly attached (‗fused‘ or ‗de-
fused‘) is said to have different clinical implications (Hayes & Gregg, 2000; 
Hayes et al., 1999). These differing implications form two distinct hypotheses 
which can be tested through measures found outside ACT. They will now be 
considered in turn. 
Fusion with self-as-content. When one‘s sense of being is fused to self-
as-content, Hayes and Gregg (2000) write that three tendencies arise: a) a 
distorted, dishonest self-image is adhered to, b) it is fixed, rigid and hostile to 
change, and c) it will be defended and protected, even if it is negative and 
detrimental. Such tendencies will be most apparent when the individual has 
very low levels of psychological flexibility (Luoma et al., 2006). According to 
these characteristics, in conditions of low psychological flexibility ACT would 
expect individuals with rigid self-concepts to act more defensively. 
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Findings outside ACT. Research suggests that self-defensiveness can 
take the form of ‗psychological reactance‘ (Beutler, Moleiro & Talebi, 2002; 
Beutler, Rocco, Moleiro & Talebi, 2001). Reactance is a distinctive type of 
resistance. It is defined as those behaviours which function to preserve 
threatened personal freedoms, or preserve lost ones. Dowd and Siebel (1990) 
assert that such behaviour can function as a means of protecting and defending 
one‘s self-concept. Johnson and Bulboltz (2000) found that reactance can fulfil 
a need to differentiate one‘s self from others, and it has been associated with 
autonomy and identity (Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993; Dowd, Wallbrown, Sanders & 
Yesenosky, 1994).  
Similar conclusions have been reached in implicit self-theory literature. In a 
review of two decade‘s research into the area, Dweck (2000) summarised that 
people with a rigid sense of self tend to be more pre-occupied with defending 
and protecting a positive self-image, and avoid situations in which this self-
concept is challenged. They are less open to self-growth, development and 
positive change than those with a less fixed self-theory. [See Extended 
Background 1.5 for further discussion of reactance literature. Further discussion 
relating to the implicit self-theory literature can be found in section 1.6] 
Specific hypothesis 1. Therefore, it would appear that ACT‘s 
characterisation of a person fused to their self-concept as rigid and defensive 
when psychologically inflexible is supported by relevant literature. If so, then 
constructs from this supportive literature could be used to test ACT‘s assertions 
regarding a fused self-as-content. These assertions are summarised in the 
following hypothesis: 
When individuals have a rigid sense of self, they will display higher reactance 
when they have low levels of psychological flexibility. This reactance functions 
as a means of self-defence. 
This hypothesis seeks to test ACT‘s claim that when a person is strongly fused 
with self-as-content, psychological inflexibility and rigidity correlate with 
defensiveness. Clinically, these characteristics would present as resistant to 
treatment, as therapeutic change would fragment a brittle sense of identity that 
is not conducive to being altered. Maintaining such a way of being may lead to 
0910, C85RES, Research Project Report, UofN:4092614, UoL:08127520, Page 12 of 122 
 
 
appearing incongruent with the prevailing context, leading to difficulty 
maintaining a warm and appropriate therapeutic relationship, a significant 
amount of anxiety, and difficulty accepting help with it. Such high levels of 
defensiveness would only become active when psychological flexibility was low 
[see Extended Background 1.6 for a critique of how ACT’s self-as-content and 
may relate to aspects of the identity in social psychology]   
De-fusion with self-as-content. The first hypothesis investigates the 
effects of a person strongly fused with self-as-content. ACT also makes 
predictions about when a person is de-fused from self-as-content (Masuda, 
Hayes, Sackett & Twohig, 2004). Firstly, they will have a less rigid more flexible, 
dynamic, sense of self as they are not attached to a particular self-
conceptualisation. An ossified self-concept limits and constrains behaviours 
only to those which are consistent with it, being hardened and opposed to 
change, becoming set in a rigid pattern of behaviour (Hayes & Gregg, 2000). 
Freedom from a static self-image affords greater liberty to act unhindered and 
autonomously as the situation affords, not as one‘s internal self-image dictates. 
Such liberty increases the likelihood that this person will engage in independent, 
autonomous behaviour that is aimed at achieving desired goals (Hayes and 
Gregg, 2000). Such behaviour would be most apparent under conditions of 
psychological flexibility, when the individual is in open, honest and full contact 
with the present moment, acting adaptively in alignment with their values and 
goals (Bond et al., submitted).   
Findings outside ACT. Research into psychological reactance and self-
theories have come to similar conclusions. Dowd and Siebel (1990) state that 
although reactance may be used negatively in therapy by those seeking to 
defend a fixed self-concept, increased reactance may actually be a sign of 
improvement for those with a highly labile sense of self. It would reflect an 
increased ability to pursue values and goals they deem important in the face of 
opposition. Arnow et al. (2003) found that reactance positively predicted 
treatment outcome for depressed clients undergoing CBT. Similarly, Dykman 
(1998) has found that pursuing goals in order to grow and develop an evolving, 
changing sense of self negatively predicts depression. This was in contrast to 
the finding that pursuing goals in order to gain validation for a static self-concept 
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positively predicted depression. The dichotomy between a flexible and fixed 
sense of self in predicting indicators of mental distress was also found by Zhao, 
Dweck and Mueller (1998), as cited in Dweck (2000). [Extended Background 
1.5 discusses reactance, 1.6 discusses the distinctions found between flexible 
and fixed self-theorists.]  
Specific hypothesis 2. If ACT‘s theorised relationship between the self 
and psychological flexibility were valid, it would also accurately predict certain 
tendencies of those who are de-fused from self-as-content. Such people would 
have a flexible sense of self and, under conditions of psychological flexibility, 
would be more likely to assertively and confidently pursue personally valued 
goals (Hayes et al., 1999). Such behaviour could take the form of reactance, 
assuming such behaviour to be in the service of valued goals rather than 
protecting self-as-content.  Therefore a second hypothesis can be put forward 
to test ACT‘s theory of the self:   
When they have high levels of psychological flexibility, individuals with a flexible 
sense of self will show high levels of reactance. This reactance functions as a 
means of pursuing valued ends. 
This hypothesis tests ACT‘s prediction that de-fusion from self-as-content will 
lead to a flexible sense of self that assertively pursues valued ends when 
psychologically flexible. These characteristics would be conducive to 
therapeutic change, although individuals exhibiting them may not often feel the 
need for psychotherapy as they are likely to have minimal amounts of distress 
and a strong propensity to act in a present oriented, value-based and adaptive 
manner. Other characteristics may include a lack of pre-occupation with self-
image and an interest and openness to challenging experiences that present an 
opportunity for self-growth. The requisite level of psychological flexibility needed 
for such value-based reactance means it would only arise when psychological 
flexibility is high.  
Aims of the present research 
This study seeks to investigate one of the six processes currently considered 
central to ACT. This aspect of ACT is logically coherent and receives indirect 
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support through ACT‘s promising and burgeoning evidence base (Hayes et al., 
2006). However, ACT‘s hypotheses regarding the self and therapeutic change 
have not, to our knowledge, received any specific empirical support. The current 
study aims to fulfil this need by testing the predictions ACT makes about self-
as-content. In doing so it draws together psychological reactance and implicit 
self-theory literature. Such synthesis may help ground ACT in other, seemingly 
pertinent, branches of psychology. It should be noted that this study tests only 
one process amongst six in ACT. As they all interact to facilitate psychological 
flexibility, singling out the current process for specific analysis seeks to 
understand it in greater depth, but is limited in scope. 
Method 
Participants  
172 individuals took part in the study, 108 (63%) female and 63 (37%) male). 
The modal age category was 25 to 29 (78 participants) , the mean 35-39. Ages 
ranged from between 18 and 24 to over 85. 137 (80%) participants described 
themselves as ‗Caucasian,‘ 14 (8%) as ‗Mixed,‘ 12 (7%) as ‗Asian,‘ 2 (1%) as 
‗Black‘ and 1(1%)  as ‗Chinese.‘  60 (35%) reported having no specific religious 
beliefs, 47 (27%) reported being Christian, 31 (18%) Atheist and 27 (16%) 
holding other religious beliefs. 141 (82%) of the sample were born within the UK. 
[See Extended Method 2.1. for discussion of sample size, demographics and 
inclusion/exclusion criteria.] 
Procedure  
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from a University Ethics Panel (see 
Appendices). Participants were contacted via email or poster from Universities, 
a public library, workplaces and retail outlets in the East Midlands, United 
Kingdom, as well as a social networking website. They completed an internet-
based questionnaire, after verifying they were over 18 and giving informed 
consent. After providing demographic information they completed the following 
measures in turn, before being thanked and re-presented with contact details. 
[See Extended Method 2.2. and 2.3. for further details on procedure and ethical 
considerations.]  
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Measures  
Instruments listed below measured rigidity of self, psychological reactance and 
psychological flexibility respectively. [See Extended Methods 2.4 for further 
psychometrics and justification of the measures used] 
Kind of Person ‘Implicit’ Theory – ‘Self’ Form for Adults. (Dweck, 2000). 
This eight-item measure is responded to on a 6-point scale, ranging from 
―strongly agree‖ to ―strongly disagree.‖ Four items referred to a fixed self-
concept (e.g. ―You can do things differently, but the important parts of who you 
are can‘t really be changed‖), four a flexible one (e.g. ―All people can change 
even their most basic qualities‖). Reverse scoring ‗fixed self-concept‘ items 
meant higher scores reflected greater endorsement of a flexible sense of self. 
‗Fixed,‘ ‗Mixed‘ and ‗Flexible‘ groups were constructed by dividing at +/- 1 
standard deviation. Levy and Dweck (unpublished manuscript) report high 
internal reliability ( from .93 to .95) and test-retest reliability (.82 over 1-
week, .71 over four weeks). In the current study Cronbach‘s =.93.  Dweck, 
Chiu and Hong (1995) carried out validity investigations into the measure in 
terms of convergent, divergent and construct validity. Dweck (2000) 
summarising that the measure taps into assumptions about the self that are 
distinct from other cognitive and behavioural constructs, but have behavioural, 
emotional and cognitive consequences. Although the authors of this measure 
label it as iimplicit,‘ it seems that the measure itself fits an extremely loose 
definition of ‗implicit,‘ if at all [See Extended Paper 2.4.1.1. for further 
information and discussion] 
Therapeutic Reactance Scale (TRS). (Dowd, Milne & Wise, 1991). The TRS 
contains 28 items (e.g. ―if I am told what to do, I often do the opposite‖), 
responded to on a four-point scale (ranging from ‗strongly disagree‘ to ‗strongly 
agree‘). High scores indicate greater reactance. Dowd et al. (1991) reported a 
test-retest reliability of .59 over three weeks, and an internal consistency of .84. 
In the current study Cronbach‘s =.76.  In terms of validity, correlations with the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) K-scale (negative 
correlation of -.27, p<.005)   and the Rotter External Locus of Control Scale 
measuring defensive responding (correlation with internality of .35, p<.0005) 
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suggest convergent validity. The Counselor Rating Form-Short, the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory and the Beck Depression Inventory provide evidence for 
divergent validity (Dowd et al., 1991). There is consistent evidence that the TRS 
measures resistance in psychotherapy (Beutler et al., 2002), suggesting strong 
predictive validity.  [See Extended Paper 2.4.2.1. for further information]    
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II). (Bond et al., submitted). 
The AAQ-II contains ten items (e.g. ―I‘m afraid of my feelings‖), responded to 
with a 7-point scale (ranging from ―never true‖ to ―always true‖), keyed so that 
low scores indicate greater psychological flexibility. ‗High,‘ ‗Moderate‘ and ‗Low‘ 
groups were constructed by dividing at +/- 1 standard deviation.  Bond et al. 
(submitted) established satisfactory internal and test-retest reliability (.80 after 3 
months, .78 after 1 year). In the current study Cronbach‘s =.83.   
 Convergent and divergent validity was established through correlating the 
AAQ-II to a range of measures of psychological distress (see Hayes et al., 
2006). Bond et al. (submitted) found it to have ecological validity in terms of 
work performance, including at one year follow-up. However, they also found 
that the three positively valenced items added no predictive validity. [See 
Extended Paper 2.4.3.1. for further information]. 
Results 
After demographic and descriptive statistics were generated the assumption of 
normality was assessed, only age needing to be manipulated to meet it. Two 
outliers on the self-theory measure were found and corrected. Reverse items 
were transformed. The Kind of Person Self-Theory Form and AAQ-II scores 
were grouped. A Pearson Correlation Co-efficient matrix revealed that gender 
correlated with the dependent variable, but did not correlate with the 
independent variables. In order to partial out its effect on reactance it was 
appropriate to treat it as a co-variate in the main analysis. Principal components 
analysis suggested a slightly different factor structure for reactance than found 
by Bulboltz, Thomas and Donnell (2003), but this was treated with scepticism as 
n was not adequate for reliable factor analysis to be performed (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). Other variables had previously been found to be uni-dimensional. 
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[See Extended Results 3.1 – 3.4 for descriptives, tests of normality, Pearson 
correlational analysis and factor analysis.]  
Prior to the main analysis assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of 
variance, homogeneity of regression slopes and reliability of co-variate 
measurement were evaluated and found to be satisfactory. The original sample 
of 172 was reduced to 171 as one individual did not provide their gender. No 
other data in the sample was missing. [See Extended Results 3.5 for tests of 
ANCOVA assumptions.] 
In line with the stated hypotheses, a 3 by 3 between-subjects analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) was performed to assess if a) individuals with a rigid 
sense of self displayed more reactance when psychological inflexible and b) 
individuals with a flexible sense of self were highly reactant when high in 
psychological flexibility. Independent variables consisted of self-theory (Rigid, 
Mixed, Flexible) and psychological flexibility (Low, Moderate, High). The 
dependent variable was psychological reactance. The co-variate was gender. 
Analyses were performed using SPSS 16, weighting cells for their sample size 
in order to adjust for unequal n. 
After adjusting for the effect of gender, there was a significant interaction effect 
between self-theory and psychological flexibility [F (4, 161) =2.91, p=.02], with a 
moderate effect size (partial eta squared=.07). This interaction is summarised in 
Figure 2, adjusted and unadjusted means for each combination of interacting 
groups provided in Table 2. Neither of the main effects were statistically 
significant [Self-theory: F (2,161) =.209, p=.81; Psychological flexibility: F (2, 
161) =1.11, p=.331]. There was a significant main effect for the co-variate, 
gender [F (1, 161) =16.47, p<.001].  
Table 1: Sense of Self x Psychological flexibility Group, Mean Overall 
Reactance 
Sense of 
Self 
Psychological 
flexibility 
N Unadjusted 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mean adjusted 
for n & gender 
Standard 
Error 
Fixed Low 4 74.25 .957 75.65 2.99 
 Moderate 22 66.55 5.91 66.56 1.27 
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 High 4 69.75 5.44 69.25 2.98 
 Total 30 68.00 5.99   
Mixed Low 17 70.82 6.91 69.54 1.48 
 Moderate 81 68.84 6.48 68.93 .67 
 High 20 66.20 4.15 66.46 1.33 
 Total 118 68.68 6.31   
Flexible Low  5 67.20 2.95 67.84 2.67 
 Moderate 14 68.14 7.88 68.46 1.59 
 High 4 74.00 6.38 73.50 2.98 
 Total 23 68.96 7.04   
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Figure 2: Psychological reactance varies depending upon interaction 
between self-theory and psychological flexibility 
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To identity which specific groups had significantly different levels of reactance, 
this overall interaction effect was investigated using post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons (see Tables 3 and 4).   
Hypothesis One  
When individuals have a rigid sense of self, they will display higher reactance 
when they have low levels of psychological flexibility.  
When individuals endorsed a rigid self-theory, those in the ‗low‘ end of the 
psychological flexibility spectrum were significantly more reactant than those 
within the ‗moderate‘ range (see Table 2). Therefore the null hypothesis was 
rejected. 
Table 2: Post-hoc pairwise comparisons for individuals with a rigid self-theory 
(dependent variable: Psychological Reactance)  
(I) 
Psychological 
flexibility 
(J) 
Psychological 
flexibility 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Significance 
Low Moderate 7.89 3.17 .019* 
Moderate High -3.13 3.08 .32 
High Low -4.76 4.14 .26 
* = significant at <.05 level, ** = significant at <.01 level. 
Hypothesis Two  
When they have high levels of psychological flexibility, individuals with a flexible 
sense of self will show high levels of reactance. 
Amongst those at the ‗high‘ end of the psychological flexibility spectrum, people 
with a flexible self-theory were significantly more reactant than people with a 
mixed self-theory (see Table 4). 
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Table 3: Post-hoc pairwise comparisons for individuals with high psychological 
flexibility (dependent variable: Psychological Reactance)  
(I) Implicit 
Self-Theory 
(J) Implicit 
Self-theory 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Significance 
Rigid Mixed -2.93 2.47 .25 
Flexible Mixed 7.18 2.47 .008** 
Flexible Rigid 4.25 3.16 .19 
* = significant at <.05 level, ** = significant at <.01 level. 
Distinguishing defensive from value-based reactance  
Bulboltz and Johnson (2003) established four sub-factors of psychological 
reactance. Three of these appeared consistent with being used for either self-
defence or pursuing values (‗preservation of freedom,‘ ‗avoidance of conflict,‘ 
‗lack of susceptibility to influence‘). The other however (‗resentment of 
authority‘), seemed to function largely as a means of protecting one‘s self 
against perceived threat, rather than a means of achieving valued goals. 
Therefore this sub-factor was used to differentiate between these two functions 
of reactance: if individuals were high in ‗resentment of authority‘ this was 
interpreted as defensive behaviour. Therefore, for hypotheses 1 and 2 to be met, 
those in hypothesis 1 should show significantly higher levels of resentment of 
authority. This was investigated using the same experimental design described 
above, only substituting overall reactance for the resentment of authority sub-
factor. 
After adjusting for the effect of gender, there was a significant interaction effect 
between self-theory and psychological flexibility [F (4, 161) =4.43, p=.002], with 
a large-to-moderate effect size (partial eta squared=.10). This interaction is 
summarised in Figure 3, adjusted and unadjusted means for each combination 
of interacting groups provided in Table 5. There was a significant main effect for 
psychological flexibility [F (2,161) = 6.21, p = .003; partial eta squared = .07] 
and the co-variate gender [F (1,161) = 18.32, p < .0001; partial eta squared 
= .10], but no main effect for self-theory [F (2,161) = 1.07, p = .35; partial eta 
squared = .01]  
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Table 4: Sense of Self x Psychological flexibility Group, Mean Resentment of 
Authority 
Sense of 
Self 
Psychological 
flexibility 
N Unadjusted 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mean adjusted 
for n & gender 
Standard 
Error 
Fixed Low 4 15.50 1.29 16.01 1.04 
 Moderate 22 11.00 2.20 11.01 0.44 
 High 4 11.25 2.99 11.07 1.04 
 Total 30 11.63 2.65   
Mixed Low 17 12.65 2.71 12.18 0.52 
 Moderate 81 11.22 2.09 11.25 0.23 
 High 20 10.05 1.54 10.14 0.47 
 Total 118 11.23 2.21   
Flexible Low 5 12.58 2.00 10.23 0.93 
 Moderate 14 11.13 2.67 10.90 0.55 
 High 4 10.46 1.50 11.57 1.04 
 Total 23 11.24 2.31    
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Post-hoc tests revealed that when psychological flexibility was low, individuals 
with a rigid self-theory were significantly showed higher levels of resentment of 
authority than either that with a mixed or flexible self-theory. Furthermore, 
flexible self-theorists were significantly less resentful of authority than mixed 
self-theorists at low levels of psychological flexibility (see Table 6). There were 
no significant differences at moderate or high levels of psychological flexibility. 
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Figure 3: Resentment of authority varies depending upon interaction 
between self-theory and psychological flexibility 
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Table 5: Post-hoc pairwise comparisons for individuals with low psychological 
flexibility (dependent variable: Resentment of authority)  
(I) Implicit 
Self-Theory 
(J) Implicit 
Self-theory 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. Error Significance 
Rigid Mixed 2.85 1.18 .025* 
Rigid Flexible 5.50 1.43 .001** 
Flexible Mixed -2.65 1.08 .02* 
* = significant at <.05 level, ** = significant at <.01 level. 
Discussion 
This study explored whether ACT‘s hypotheses regarding fusion to and de-
fusion from self-as-content were accurate. Two predictions were made to test 
this: 
1. That low psychological flexibility and a rigid self-concept would 
correlate with high reactance; such reactance being a form of identity defence. 
Self-defensiveness would not be necessary at higher levels of flexibility. This 
prediction was supported by the results, which showed that those with a rigid 
self-concept were significantly more reactant when psychologically inflexible 
than when moderately flexible. Moreover, this reactance tended to be of a more 
self-defensive rather than values-developing type. 
 
2. That high psychological flexibility and a flexible self-concept would 
correlate with higher reactance. However, this reactance would be an 
expression of value-driven behaviour rather than self-defence. Highly adaptive 
reactance would not be consistent with lower levels of psychological flexibility. 
This prediction was also supported. Results indicated that at high levels of 
psychological flexibility those with a flexible self-theory were significantly more 
reactant than those with a mixed self-theory. Furthermore, this reactance was 
not of self-defensive kind, suggesting it to be of a value-based nature.       
 
These findings provide the first specific empirical validation of ACT‘s theory of 
self-as-content that we know of. In validating this theory concepts from outside 
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ACT have been used, helping to ground it in other currents of research which 
may prove pertinent. As the findings of hypothesis 1 better characterise clinical 
problems they will be discussed first, before findings from hypothesis 2 are used 
to illustrate how they may be approached constructively. 
Clarifying clinical challenges 
Hayes and Gregg (2000) suggest that those identified by hypothesis 1 would 
find it hard to maintain an objective or balanced view of themselves, being more 
pre-occupied with trying to construct a consistent self-concept, searching out 
confirmatory evidence and trying to ignore or avoid disconfirmation. Such 
tendencies build up a rigid self-concept which endorses certain behaviour 
patterns and censures others. These patterns would tend to be fixed and loathe 
to change, making the person less able to adapt to changing situations or 
spontaneously take advantage of opportunities which arise. Such opportunities 
for self-growth or satisfaction may be rejected on the grounds that ‗I‘m just not 
that type of person.‘ Failures and setbacks would cause cognitive dissonance 
on the same grounds (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).  
This self-concept will be defended and protected, even if it negates the 
possibility of developing a new, more adaptive way of being. Therapy would be 
a prime candidate for provoking such identity defence. This would be especially 
so if it explicitly targeted realigning the client‘s negative self-concepts to 
increase their consistency with reality. As Hayes et al. (1999) state, if ‗Me = 
conceptualisation‘ and ‗therapeutic change = eliminate conceptualisation‘ then 
‗eliminate conceptualisation = eliminate Me.‘ Unsurprisingly, such therapeutic 
efforts would naturally be feared and resisted. Thus, hypothesis 1 uncovers 
tendencies which are very challenging for psychotherapy: the obvious solution 
to the problem (changing maladaptive self-as-content) will be met with hostile 
rejection (defending self-as-content). How these challenges may be approached 
will now be considered through a discussion of the clinical implications of 
hypothesis 2. [Extended Discussion 4.1 discusses this theme of identity 
resistance through previous findings, and highlights other areas of the extended 
paper to which this matter is relevant.] 
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Presenting clinical resolutions 
Process over content. The broadest clinical implication of these findings 
are to work at the level of personality (Giesen-Bloo et al., 2008), i.e. self-as-
content. Crucially, this does not mean working to change personality content; 
what it does mean is working with the process of how the person relates to this 
content. This fundamental distinction is clarified by Rogers‘ (1958) exploration 
of the process by which behaviour and personality change occurs. What he 
found was unexpected and revealing. As he expressed this finding with great 
lucidity and precision, it will be quoted at length: 
―I was thinking of change as an entity and searching for its specific 
attributes. What gradually emerged…was a continuum of a 
different sort…Individuals move…not from a fixity or homeostasis 
through change to a new fixity, though such a process is indeed 
possible. But much the more significant continuum is from fixity to 
changingness, from rigid structure to flow, from stasis to process.‖                      
(p.143) 
At the fixed end of this continuum Rogers (1958) noted that personal constructs 
are held rigidly; they are not even recognised as constructs but thought of as 
facts. From an ACT perspective, subjective relational frames have become 
confused with the objective state of things: the map is mistaken for the territory 
(Hayes et al., 1999). As the therapeutic process unfolds, Rogers (1958) found 
that the client‘s conception of the self as object tends to disappear, as they feel 
cut loose from their previously stabilised framework. In ACT terms, this equates 
to reduced fusion to self-as-content (Hayes & Gregg, 2000). In its stead, Roger 
(1958) notes, a sense of self arises from the subjective and reflexive awareness 
of experience. It arises out of confidence in evolving process, personal 
constructs becoming loosely held and subject to re-negotiation in the light of 
new experience. Such contact with present moment experience, without 
defence, has similarities with psychological flexibility (Bond et al., submitted).1  
                                           
1
 Roger’s (1958) use of the word ‘confidence’ is particularly striking when considering Hayes et al.’s 
(1999) analysis of  the term, deriving from the Latin ‘with fidelity.’  
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This process, Rogers (1958) concludes, necessitates change in the self. Rather 
than perceiving their self as an object distinct from experience, the self 
becomes the subjective awareness of experience – self and experience are 
synonymous. Rogers (1958; p.149) ends with the statement that ―the person 
becomes a unity of flow, of motion. He has changed; but what seems most 
significant, he has become an integrated process of changingness.‖ This sense 
the self, which is unitary and stable despite the perpetual motion of experienced 
content, is akin to self-as-context (Hayes, 1984).  
It appears that concept of the change process in psychotherapy is consistent 
with ACT‘s understanding of the process of self-as-content/context, to which the 
current findings add empirical support. This is consistent with ACT‘s assertion 
that elements of its approach can be found across a broad spectrum of 
modalities, from gestalt to Rogerian and existential.   [see Extended Discussion 
4.2.1. regarding cross-theoretical support for this model of therapeutic change, 
4.4 regarding cultural considerations.]  
As the current findings support this model of therapeutic change regarding the 
self, it suggests that therapeutic work to change how the client relates to self-
as-content, rather than explicitly targeting content change, would be most 
beneficial in dealing with the difficulties delineated above. Work of this kind 
would involve a movement from fixity to fluidity, from rigidity to flexibility, moving 
attention from the content of the self to the process of relating to it. ACT 
suggests a number of specific techniques to facilitate this. Three categories of 
these are described below. 
De-fusion from self-as-content. ACT does not seek to change the 
content of self-as-content. It reasons that this very process of evaluating what is 
and is not wanted within the client has contributed to their difficulties in the first 
place (Luoma et al., 2006). ACT suggests that these difficulties can be better 
approached through de-fusing with this self-concept. Healy et al. (2008) used 
prefixes in negative self-statements to identify the impact of defusion (e.g. Is the 
statement ―I am having the thought that I am stupid‘ experienced differently to ‗I 
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am stupid‘?). They found this defusion technique to increase participants‘ 
willingness to think about these statements, and decrease their discomfort when 
doing so. Unexpectedly, they also found that when participants de-fused from 
negative self-statements, they rated them as more believable. Linking this study 
explicitly to the current matter of self and psychotherapy, increased ability to 
think about and consider aversive self-elements seriously, and finding this 
process less aversive, would decrease experiential avoidance and fusion to a 
distorted self-concept.  
Crocker, Niiya and Mischkowski (2008) corroborate this and validate another 
technique. They found that writing about important values decreases 
defensiveness, facilitating positive attitudes towards personal change (e.g. 
smokers becoming more accepting of information that smoking harms health). 
Importantly, they found that this occurred because participants became more 
concerned about others and less concerned with their self-integrity (i.e. self-
image or self-worth). That is, their relationship to self-as-content had changed, 
not the contents of self-as-content. Reduced defensiveness from writing about 
important values was not due to increased self-worth, but increased ‗self 
transcendence‘ (Crocker et al., 2008). [see Extended Results 4.2.2. regarding 
the juxtaposition of self-esteem with flexibility.] 
Connection with self-as-context. Equivalent to de-fusing with self-as-
content is connecting with self-as-context. Primary techniques to validate this 
are metaphor and mindfulness. Hayes and Gregg (2000) give the example of 
the chessboard metaphor. Here, the client‘s battle between their ‗dark side‘ (e.g. 
depression, self-harming, substance abuse) and ‗better nature‘ is portrayed as 
the battle between the black and white pieces on a chessboard. It is discussed 
how thinking of one‘s self as a player in this battle is tiring, hopeless and never-
ending. One can gain respite from this struggle by thinking of one‘s self as the 
board itself: the context in which the battle unfolds, but a place from which it can 
be watched in safety and security.  
Mindfulness interventions involve bringing attention into the present moment 
and can be taught through a variety of meditation exercises (e.g. Segal, 
Williams & Teasdale, 2002). Baer‘s (2003) review of mindfulness interventions 
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concluded that despite flaws in methodology, such interventions help to improve 
psychological functioning and alleviate mental health difficulties. Effect sizes 
ranged from 0.15 to 1.65 at post-treatment, with a mean effect size collapsed 
over 15 studies (weighted by sample size) being 0.59, representing a healthy 
moderate effect.    
The therapeutic alliance. The therapeutic alliance has been found to 
interact with specific techniques and facilitate the change process underlying 
clinical improvement for those with personality disorder (Spinhoven, Giesen-
Bloo, van Dyck, Kooiman & Arntz, 2007). The importance of the therapeutic 
alliance is common to cognitive-behavioural (Leahy, 2008) and dynamic 
traditions (Malan,1979). Reactance studies suggest that highly reactant clients 
will meet directive therapeutic styles with resistance, and that they have poorer 
outcomes than non-directive, client led therapeutic relationships (Karno & 
Longabaugh, 2005, 2007). Resistant clients have been found to react well to 
greater autonomy in the therapeutic relationship (Newman, 2002). Paradoxical 
interventions have also been found to be effective for this client group (Hunsley, 
1997). Techniques such as free association, in which the client autonomously 
comes into contact with aspects of themselves that a rigid self-as-content has 
hidden, at a pace that they control, may also be appropriate (Kanter et al., 
2001). It may facilitate a process of overcoming experiential avoidance, a key 
aspect of fostering psychological flexibility, which has been long recognised by 
a number of traditions (Hayes et al., 2006). Hayes et al. (1999) emphasise close 
non-evaluative attention to the experiences of the unfolding dynamic between 
therapist and client, and engaging with these experiences as honestly and 
without defence as possible. These aspects of the therapeutic relationship aim 
to move the client away from rigid fusion to self-as-content towards the process 
of relating to these contents in a looser, more accepting manner, increasing the 
ability pursue value-based behaviour. 
Limitations and difficulties  
From the outset, we should heed Kanter et al.‘s (2001) caveat that direct 
observation of anything so private and non-observable as the self is quite 
impossible. Therefore empirical investigation into the matter of selfhood is 
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always limited. Another a priori limitation of the study is that it does not measure 
Hayes and Gregg‘s (2000) first tendency of a fused self-as-content, which is a 
distorted and dishonest sense of self. Such a tendency may be implied with low 
levels of psychological flexibility, but direct measurement would provide further 
empirical testing of ACT‘s predictions. Beyond these limitations which were 
inherent within the study at the outset, three other difficulties in interpretation 
are immediately apparent.  
One complication within these findings was that reactance increased for those 
with a rigid as well as flexible self-theory when highly psychologically flexible. 
Although this trend was not significant, it was unexpected. It may reflection the 
population studied. Alternatively, it may be that although these individuals are 
strongly fused with self-as-content, this self-image is an accurate reflection of 
their personal values. Therefore acting in accordance with it is to act in 
congruence with these goals. As ACT focuses on a clinical population this 
congruence is rarer – when people are suffering, their rigid self-concepts tend to 
conflict with the life they want to lead, and the values they wish to embody 
(Hayes & Gregg, 2000). It is worth noting that, from an ACT perspective, a 
traditional cognitive approach would wish to fuse the client with such an 
adaptive and constructive self-concept, rather than de-fuse from any self-
conceptualisation per se (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008). 
A second potential issue with these findings was that significant differences in 
reactance occurred between low and moderate psychological flexibility for those 
fused to self-as-context, and between flexible and mixed self-theorists amongst 
those who were highly flexible. In short, no significant differences between the 
extremes were detected, only differences between one extreme and the 
average. This is perhaps understandable given the small sample size of each 
extreme group. Statistical corrections were used to accommodate this inequality, 
which increased the standard error. Increased error would make differences in 
adjusted mean less likely to be significant. This limitation of the current study 
may be rectified by future research which focuses specifically on these extreme 
groups in greater numbers, rather than in the context of a normally distributed 
population. However, a significant difference between the extreme groups was 
found at low psychological flexibility when predicting resentment of authority. 
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This finding suggested that the reactance used by fixed self-theorists is 
potentially more maladaptive form of self-defence, whereas for flexible self-
theorists reactance is more likely to be based on the pursuit of values. 
A third and related, limitation lies in the dual function of psychological reactance. 
These findings suggest that reactance, as behaviour which exercises personal 
freedom, may protect the self-as-content or be used to pursue valued ends (or, 
in the case of those whose self-as-content embodies those ends, perhaps do 
both). Although there is no logical reason why reactance cannot perform both 
functions, mainly self-defence has been posited in the literature (e.g. Dowd, 
Pepper & Seibel, 2001). An explanation may be that this body of research has 
not been exposed to the distinction between self-as-context and self-as-concept. 
Whilst reactance may function to protect self-as-content in hypothesis 1, it can 
function as an adaptive means to valued goals in hypothesis 2. Here, behaviour 
which is topographically similar has dissimilar functions. Delineating topography 
from function is an important part of ACT (Hayes et al., 1999), and future 
research would need to clarify how this distinction applies to reactance. The 
current findings suggest it may have two functions, which may compliment or 
contradict.  [Extended Discussion 4.3 provides an in-depth critique of strengths 
and limitations.] 
Future directions 
Other variables. This study focuses on a person‘s relationship to self-as-
content. Mindfulness is a variable which was not included, but may well be 
highly relevant to this relationship. Not only is there a wealth of literature relating 
it to the ability to tolerate aversive private events (e.g. Segal et al., 2002) and 
some indications this can specifically relate to the self (Farb, 2007, 2010), it can 
also be measured as a relatively stable trait (Baer et al., 2008). This would bring 
in self-as-context, providing a fuller picture of ACT‘s process of relating to the 
self. A second variable not included in the current study is the extent to which 
an individual is prone to distorting their self-image despite contradictory 
evidence. Although lower psychological flexibility implies an increased 
propensity for distortion (Hayes et al., 1999), direct measurement of this would 
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usefully investigate the third characteristic of self-as-content fusion listed by 
Hayes and Gregg (2000).  
Clinical populations. As these findings relate largely to the process of 
therapy and rigid identity as a source of therapeutic resistance, a clear means 
of developing it would be to investigate these processes in situ. People with 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) have been found to express higher than 
average levels of reactance, Siebel and Dowd (2001) reporting a mean of 72.71 
on the TRS, the measure used in the current study. People with BPD have also 
been known to suffer extensive difficulties surrounding the issue of selfhood 
(APA, 2004; Jorgensen, 2006). Considering the prevalence of BPD in the 
general population (2%) (APA, 2004) and the proportion of the present non-
clinical sample fitting the criteria for hypothesis 1 (2.4%), these findings may be 
worth investigating within the context of BPD.  
An interesting aspect of this application would be the adaptive and maladaptive 
understandings of flexible self-theory. Whilst it has been investigated positively 
here, in terms of the belief in the potential for positive change, self-growth and 
development, DSM-IV‘s (2004) definition of BPD refers to a persistently 
unstable sense of self as something distressing and damaging. There are two 
distinctions between these different concepts of self-flexibility which may be 
investigated by clinical studies. Firstly, self-flexibility in the positive sense is 
anchored by the consistent pursuit of personal certain values (Lampinen, 
Odegard & Leding, 2004), bound together by a coherent narrative (McAdams, 
2001). The negative sense is not bound by such values, therefore is not 
integrated in the same sense. Kanter et al. (2001) suggest this type of identity-
flexibility is externally controlled – the person is reacting to the influence of 
outside agents – whereas Rogers (1958) suggests the other is internally 
directed. Fuchs (2007) emphasises this point, pointing to the fragmentary 
nature of BPD in modern society, which contrasts with Rogers (1958) equating 
of self-flexibility with wholeness and congruence. These proposed distinctions 
would be usefully investigated by future research. 
Psychotherapy and the self. A final direction would be to further pursue 
the psychotherapeutic implications of a behavioural understanding of the self. 
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This is especially intriguing as a behavioural understanding of the self denies 
that it exists as a separately existing entity. It is simply a psychological construct 
of the same ontological status as emotions and thoughts (Kanter et al., 2001). 
This view has also gained prominence amongst neuroscientists and 
philosophers (Flanagan, 1996). Parfit (1984) argues that there is no separately 
existing ‗doer‘ behind the deed or ‗thinker‘ behind the thought, only deeds being 
done and thoughts being thought. Personal identity, he concludes, is not what 
matters.  
Blackmore (1999) cites evidence of this from a neuropsychological point of view, 
pointing out that even through psychotherapy deals in the self and its substance 
(or lack of) it is not based on sound scientific principles regarding these matters. 
A behavioural treatment of the self, such as that found in ACT, is consistent with 
these empirical foundations. An interesting avenue for further research would 
be how this research on the self could be synthesised, and what implications 
such a theoretically and empirically coherent model would have for 
psychotherapy, and its relationship to the self.  
Conclusions 
These findings are consistent with ACT‘s predictions regarding the self and 
psychotherapy, which assert that a) a rigid sense of self functions as a defence 
when distressed, impeding therapeutic change and b) a flexible sense of self 
facilitates value-based behaviour when psychologically well. Clinically, these 
findings implicate the importance of a focus on process over content when 
clients present with personality-based difficulties. Specific means of achieving 
this emphasis include thought defusion, validation of important values, 
mindfulness interventions, free association and the therapeutic alliance. The 
overarching psychotherapeutic focus is on the client‘s process of relating to 
their self-concept, rather than altering its contents. Theoretically, these findings 
help to contextualise ACT within associated streams of literature which have not 
been previously synthesised.  
Journal article word count: 8,814 approx. (including references) n.b. See 
appendices regarding journal stipulations (no more than 10,000 words including 
references).
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1. Extended background 
1.1. ACT’s evidence base 
To strike a balance between clarity, brevity and rigour, this overview focuses on 
two major meta-analyses of ACT‘s empirical base: Hayes et al. (2006), who are 
themselves proponents of ACT, and Öst (2008), who appears not to be.  
1.1.1. Correlational studies. Hayes et al. (2006) review 32 studies 
which correlate psychological flexibility (the variable which ACT wishes to 
increase in clients) with a range of quality of life outcome measures. These 
include those measuring psychopathologies (e.g. Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) for depression, Beck Anxiety Inventory for Anxiety (BAI) for anxiety, the 
Post-Traumatic Diagnostic Scale for PTSD), general quality of life measures 
(e.g. General Health Questionnaire, Quality of Life Inventory) or sub-clinical 
issues such as job performance, negative affect or stress. Psychological 
flexibility was measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ) 
(Hayes et al., 2004), or variants which hone in on specific difficulties, such as 
chronic pain. Meta-analysis of this data set found that as psychological flexibility 
increased, so did quality of life outcomes. 74 correlations produced a weighted 
effect size of .42 (.41 - .43 representing a 95% confidence interval). These 
results indicate a moderately sized positive relationship between psychological 
flexibility and a range of quality of life indicators. This finding is congruent with 
the ACT model of human distress.   
 
However, Bond et al. (submitted) note that the AAQ on occasion exhibits 
problems with internal consistency, to the extent that they found it necessary to 
develop a new version (the AAQ-II, which is used in the current study). Bond et 
al. (submitted) suggest that although the results of studies using the AAQ are 
still relevant, this measure is less psychometrically safe than its replacement, 
the AAQ-II. As the AAQ – or variants of it – were used by all the correlational 
studies reviewed by Hayes et al. (2006), the overall findings of their meta-
analysis should not be disregarded, but treated with some caution.  
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1.1.2. Component studies. Hayes et al. (2006) go on to emphasise the 
importance of conducting micro-studies on each key ACT process (i.e. contact 
with present/dominance of past; values/lack of values; committed 
action/inaction or impulsivity; self-as-context/self-as-concept; fusion/defusion; 
acceptance/experiential avoidance). These studies are essential in establishing 
whether each component process is a) psychotherapeutically active and b) 
consistent with theory.  
 
Hayes et al. (2006) found evidence supporting acceptance and de-fusion 
processes, and that these appeared to fulfil the functions given above. However, 
they concluded that other aspects of the ACT model had not been specifically 
tested. The current study is an example of this need identified in the literature 
being met, as it seeks to establish whether self-as-context/self-as-content is 
consistent with theory. This has not yet been established. After doing so, the 
next logical step would be to establish its therapeutic efficacy. This follows the 
scientific sequence of establishing the coherence of a therapeutic model before 
testing its efficacy. If this sequence is reversed it is impossible to tell which 
aspects of the theory are effective (Popper, 1963/2002).  
1.1.3. Outcome studies. Although Hayes et al. (2006) urge caution they 
report encouraging evidence from the treatment outcome literature. From 13 
studies, meta-analysis revealed an n-weighted average effect size for ACT v. 
waiting list control (WCL), placebo or treatment as usual (TAU) as d=.99 post-
treatment (overall n=248), and d=.71 (n=176) at follow-up. The total weighted 
average effect size, combining these results with ACT v. structured 
interventions designed to impact the presenting problem, was d=.66 post-
treatment (n=704) and d=.66 at follow-up (n=580). Follow-up ranged between 8 
and 52 weeks, the mode being 12 weeks (in 6 of the 13 studies). 
 
1.1.4. Review of Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs). Öst (2008) 
reviewed 13 RCTs and concluded that the mean effect size was moderate. The 
Controlled Effect Size (ES) he reported was derived from calculating Cohen‘s d, 
then transforming it to Hedge‘s g as the former ―suffers from a slight upward 
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bias when based on small samples‖ (p.307). The mean ES for ACT was 0.68 
(z=5.11, p<.0001, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.42 – 0.94). 
 
However, Öst (2008) critiques that the research methodologies of these RCTs 
were significantly less stringent than comparable CBT studies. The use of 
waiting list controls instead of placebo, for instance, is less desirable. Some 
studies combined ACT with other methodologies, making it impossible to know 
the specific effect of the ACT component on the outcome. Similarly, other RCTs 
provided little information regarding the number of therapists used, therapist 
adherence to the model or level of competence and experience. This lack of 
clarity makes it hard to partial out the effectiveness of the therapist from the 
effectiveness of the model used. Because of these deficiencies, Öst (2008) 
concluded that ACT did not fulfil the criteria for an empirically supported 
treatment, as defined by the guidelines proposed by an APA Division 12 Task 
Force in 1995.    
1.1.5. Summary. This overview suggests that ACT‘s evidence base is 
promising. However, greater development in a variety of areas is necessary for 
it to become defined as ‗empirically validated‘ by those APA criteria put forward 
in Öst. One way to make greater sense of this position is to put it in historical 
context; Guidano (2009) alludes to this, and it is discussed in 1.2. 
 
1.2. Comparing ACT to CBT 
 
Comparing ACT with CBT is a prominent theme of the literature, and one which 
is hotly debated (e.g., Gaudiano, 2009; Hayes, 2008; Hofmann & Asmundson, 
2008). Lappalainen et al. (2007) finding ACT to be more effective when used by 
psychotherapy trainees. The controversies around comparison are both 
empirical and theoretical. 
1.2.1. Empirical comparisons. In Öst‘s (2008) meta-analysis, the 
methodology of ACT RCTs was compared to those of CBT and found wanting. 
Guidano (2009) offers two main defences of ACT regarding this conclusion. 
Firstly, ACT and CBT were mismatched in terms of treatment populations, 
making direct comparisons problematic. This distribution is given in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Target clinical populations of ACT and CBT randomised controlled 
trials, showing ACT to have targeted a wider spread of clinical populations than 
CBT (after Öst 2008). 
Target Clinical Populations ACT CBT 
Anxiety or stress 3 11 
Depression 2 2 
Chronic medical conditions 2 0 
Psychosis 2 0 
Pain 1 0 
Addiction 2 0 
Personality disorder 1 0 
 
Secondly, 38% of ACT‘s RCTs were funded compared to 80% of CBT‘s. This 
statistically significant difference, Gaudiano (2009) suggests, allowed more 
advanced and costly methodological procedures for CBT. He concludes that the 
limitations which Öst (2008) so scrupulously discerned in ACT are characteristic 
of any emerging psychotherapy. Comparing its RCTs to CBT‘s is akin, the title 
of his article suggests, to comparing apples and oranges. ACT‘s research 
programme must be given time to mature if it is to be directly compared to CBT. 
1.2.2. Theoretical comparisons. See Hofmann and Asmundson (2008) 
for a discussion of ACT‘s critique of CBT that stretches beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For the purposes of the current study, the element of most interest is 
ACT‘s critique of CBT‘s emphasis on altering the content of cognitions, in order 
to alter behaviour and affect. This line of argument is exemplified by Longmore 
and Worrell‘s (2007) review of the empirical literature addressing the efficacy of 
challenging and realigning client‘s thinking so that it is more consistent with 
reality. They found little evidence suggesting that this component of CBT is 
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effective, raising the question, do thoughts need to be challenged for effective 
CBT?   
From an ACT perspective the answer would be a resounding ‗no‘ (Hayes et al., 
1999). Its own basic research base (discussed in 1.3) suggests that cognitive 
patterns have been learned; they cannot be ‗unlearned‘ and replaced with 
alternative cognitions (Hayes & Berens, 2004). ACT utilises the alternative 
approach of mindfulness. Mindfulness does not seek to alter the contents of 
cognitions. More simply, it trains the client to notice them as being what they are: 
cognitions and nothing else (Kabat-Zinn, 1991).  
This distinction between a) being mindful of cognitions and b) seeking to 
challenge and replace them relates to the current study‘s focus on identity. 
Clients are not asked to change their core beliefs about themselves, the 
equivalent of altering the cognitive content of self-as-content. Rather, they are 
asked to hold this conception of themselves more lightly (Luoma, Hayes & 
Walser, 2006). As they associate themselves less with this self-concept, they 
are less prone to defend it. Thus, they have a more flexible sense of self rather 
than a more realistic or positive one (Hayes & Gregg, 2000). Such reduction in 
attachment to one‘s self-concept, or the need to defend it, facilitates 
engagement in therapeutic change and increased psychological flexibility 
(Hayes et al., 1999).  
1.2.3. Summary. More generally, Hayes (2008) argues that meaningful 
comparisons between ACT and CBT are doomed to intellectual failure as the 
latter is amorphous and difficult to tie down to specific principles, theories and 
processes. Therefore, it is better to measure ACT against its own goals. The 
current study seeks to keep within these parameters by investigating the 
internal consistency of ACT‘s process concerning the self.  
1.3. Relational Frame Theory (RFT): a linguistic explanation of human 
suffering 
 
ACT explains the connection between behaviour and human suffering through 
RFT, a departure from social psychology, which posits the self as the cause of 
0910, C85RES, Research Project Report, UofN:4092614, UoL:08127520, Page 46 of 122 
 
 
behaviour. Social psychological considerations of the self will first be provided, 
follwed by an alternative explanation from RFT. 
 
1.3.1. Social psychological considerations of self. Baumeister (1999) 
summarises that, beyond being a physical body, three universal experiences 
form the basis of selfhood. The first is the experience of ‗reflexive 
consciousness‘: the ability to be self aware. That is, one cannot directly 
perceive one‘s ‗self,‘ but can infer that it exists from observation. 
Psychologically, self-evaluation, self-consciousness and self-esteem are 
considered within this aspect of self. The second universal experience of self in 
interpersonal being. The self arises in terms of its relationships with others, both 
through how it is connected and similar, and how it is distinct and different. 
Psychologically, this aspect of self involves interactions with others and 
concepts such as pride and shame. The third seemingly universal experience of 
selfhood is that of executive functioning: the self as the agent and originator of 
its action. Constructs such as volition, autonomy, decision-making and self-
regulation all fall under this aspect of selfhood. As argued by Kanter et al., 
(2001), this approach to the self assumes that it exists as a separately existing 
entity, evoking the homunculus fallacy.     
1.3.2. As ACT cannot posit an independently existing self in the same way 
that other approaches such as social cognitive traditions might (see Extended 
Discussion), it has to rely upon an alternative explanation for what causes 
behaviour. This is provided by Relational Frame Theory (RFT). RFT suggests 
that the same verbal abilities that underpin human achievement also underpin 
much human suffering (Hayes et al., 1999). Using these abilities to attempt to 
escape suffering can, in practice, often exacerbate it. In these instances, letting 
go of verbal abilities and trying to experience the suffering fully without defence 
may be more therapeutic. Hayes et al. (1996) identify various therapeutic 
models – both traditional and ‗third wave‘ CBT – which focus on this process. 
The following sections work through these elements in greater detail. 
1.3.3. Relational framing facilitates verbal knowledge. RFT suggests 
that we understand stimuli by classifying and ordering them in relation to each 
other. This is achieved through use of relational terms such as ‗before-after,‘ 
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‗better-worse,‘ ‗bigger-smaller‘ or ‗the same as,‘ and so on. Relational frames 
are a highly efficient means of structuring and making sense of the world 
without having to directly experience all permutations of it (Hayes & Berens, 
2004). For instance, being explicitly told two facts: that Alan is taller than Bob, 
and Bob is taller than Charles, four other facts can be inferred: Bob is shorter 
than Alan, Charles is shorter than Bob, Alan is taller than Charles and Charles 
is shorter than Alan.  Therefore you may be directly taught 2 facts, but by 
relational framing you actually learn 6. Hundreds of relations can be derived 
from being taught a relational network of only twelve (Hayes et al., 1999).  
Each individual, through their experiences, constructs their own unique 
idiosyncratic relationship frame. These unique frames transform the functions of 
stimuli in unique ways, so that each person can derive different meaning from 
the same group of phenomena. This ability to construct verbal knowledge 
through relational frames has given human beings a large adaptive advantage 
over other animals. However, this evolutionary advantage is not without its 
costs (Luoma et al., 2006). 
1.3.4. Relational framing facilitates psychological pain. The mind is 
composed of elaborate and interconnected derived stimulus relations. Hayes et 
al. (1999) suggest these relations explain uniquely human suffering. Such 
suffering occurs because relational frames are bi-directional. This means that 
the verbal representation of an aversive state will itself contain unpleasant 
emotion, whereas for animals they do not.  
For instance, a pigeon may be trained to ‗report‘ when it has experienced a 
shock by pecking a button. This relationship between the event (shock) and its 
verbal representation (peck button) is uni-directional: the aversive event (shock) 
evokes a symbolic representation (peck), but the symbolic representation does 
not evoke an aversive event. The pigeon does not re-experience the shock 
when it pecks the button. In humans, however, relational framing means that 
such relationships are bi-directional. When a person reports having been 
sexually abused by her father, the past abuse (aversive event) does not just 
evoke the reporting of it (verbal representation), the verbal representation 
(report) evokes a re-experiencing of the aversive event (past abuse). Because 
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both sit within a relational frame eliciting one elicits the other. Thus, verbalising 
the report is functionally related to the event, causing the associated feelings to 
be re-encountered (or encountered for the first time, if suppressed).  
ACT and RFT explain much human suffering through the relational frames 
which provide us an evolutionary advantage. Such suffering can be 
exacerbated by our attempts to escape it (Gird & Zettle, 2009). These attempts 
are termed ‗experiential avoidance.‘ 
1.3.5. Experiential avoidance. As relational frames are bi-directional, 
verbal self-knowledge induces current psychological re-experiencing of past 
aversive events that we would naturally wish to avoid. However, attempts to 
avoid this suffering through suppression and avoidance of thoughts associated 
with it may actually increase its saliency (Hooper, Saunders & McHugh, 2010). 
Fledderus, Bohlmeijer and Pieterse (2010) found that people prone to avoiding 
such aversive experiences, or have learnt to use experiential avoidance in high-
stress situations have a higher risk of poor mental health and psychopathology.    
A review by Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette and Strosahl (1996) cited 
experiential avoidance as a means of functionally understanding diagnoses 
together when traditionally they have been tried to be comprehended apart, with 
limited success. Such an approach would address current difficulties 
surrounding co-morbidity and the inaccurate imposition of a physical illness 
medical paradigm onto mental health (Bentall, 2003). Similarly, Kashdan, 
Barrios, Forsyth & Steger‘s (2006) findings suggest experiential avoidance to be 
a diathesis underlying a generalised tendency towards psychological 
vulnerability. Regarding the present study, ACT regards self-as-content (to be 
discussed) as a key vehicle by which experiential avoidance can be 
exacerbated and maintained, depending on one‘s relation to it. The reverse of 
experiential avoidance, which this study also seeks to investigate, is 
psychological flexibility.  
1.3.6. Psychological flexibility. Experiential avoidance is seen to occur 
when individuals use their verbal abilities, which are so adaptive when 
interacting with external events, to control internal private events. In opposition 
to this ACT encourages clients to experience ―ordinary human unhappiness‖ 
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(quoting Freud in Chodoff, 2002; p.627) as it occurs, without avoidance. To do 
so is painful, but does not compound the pain into ―neurotic misery.‖ Such a 
process is inherently painful, but that reflects the realities of human existence, a 
reality we use many means to habitually conceal ourselves from (Chodoff, 
2002). Gird and Zettle (2009) clarify this contrast between normal unhappiness 
and neurotic misery by referring to ‗clean pain‘ and ‗dirty pain,‘ clean pain being 
the psychological reaction to events experienced as unpleasant, dirty pain being 
the distress arising from failed attempts to escape the experiencing of clean 
pain. 
1.3.7. Psychotherapeutic approaches. Overcoming experiential 
avoidance (equivalent to facilitating psychological flexibility) has been 
recognised as a means of reducing psychological distress within various 
therapeutic schools including psychoanalytic, Rogerian, existential and more 
recent ‗third wave‘ cognitive-behavioural approaches (Hayes et al., 1996; 
summarised in Table 7).  
1.4. Ongoing self-awareness  
 
Ongoing self-awareness is a third sense of self considered in ACT (e.g. Hayes, 
1995). However, it is not emphasised in the more current literature (e.g. Luoma 
et al., 2006). Therapeutically, it sits between self-as-content and self-as-context. 
ACT‘s understanding of self-awareness is analogous to the metaprocess of 
reflection, or ‗objective self-awareness.‘ It involves becoming objectively aware 
of ourselves and our operating systems (Lewis, 1992). Hayes and Gregg (2000) 
assert self-aware ness is a dual-edged sword: potentially helpful and harmful. It 
may have a positive role in facilitating self-control and the ability to plan and 
direct one‘s life course. However, it also encourages engagement with self-as-
content. Such engagement can be counter-productive, Hayes and Gregg (2000) 
argue, as it increases the possibility of fusion with such content, decreasing 
awareness of present moment experience. 
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Table 7: Experiential Avoidance focused cognitive-behavioural therapies 
Model Diagnosis 
targeted 
Therapeutic 
modality 
Key text 
Mindfulness-Based 
Stress Reduction 
(MBSR) 
Anxiety  
& chronic 
pain 
Groups Kabat-Zinn (1991) 
Mindfulness-Based 
Cognitive Therapy 
(MBCT)  
Depression Groups Segal, Williams & 
Teasdale, (2002), 
Acceptance & 
Commitment Therapy 
(ACT) 
Non-
specific 
Individual Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 1999) 
Dialectical 
Behavioural Therapy 
(DBT) 
 
Schema Focused 
Therapy (SFT)               
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
 
Personality 
Disorder 
 
Individual & 
Group 
 
 
Individual & 
Group 
Linehan (1993) 
 
 
 
Young (1990) 
 
1.5. Reactance 
Reactance (i.e., those behaviours which function to preserve threatened 
personal freedoms, or preserve lost ones) is an essential construct of the 
current study, because it is a class of behaviour by which a person can defend 
their self-image (as ACT would predict would happen when fused with self-as-
content) or pursue personal values (as ACT would predict to happen when de-
fused from self-as-content). However, it derives from a quite separate research 
tradition than ACT. Therefore to fully explore reactance, it needs to be 
discussed in its own right. This section seeks to do so by evaluating its 
relationship to therapeutic outcome, its status as an intra-psychic trait and/or 
interpersonal state, and the development and personality variables it has been 
found to correlate with. Before this, a brief background is given. Overall, this 
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section is intended to gain greater depth regarding a concept central to the 
current study. 
 
1.5.1. Background of reactance. Reactance was defined behaviourally in 
the journal article to maintain consistency with an ACT framework. Many 
theorists define reactance cognitively as a ‗motivational force to restore lost or 
threatened freedoms‘ (Dowd & Siebel, 1990; p.460). Dowd and Siebel (1990) 
emphasise its characterological quality and argue that resistance and reactance 
are separate concepts. Whereas resistance is generally situation-specific and 
used to protect core cognitive schemas, reactance is a more stable trait used to 
maintain an autonomous identity. As RFT argues that such identity may actually 
distil down to no more than behavioural schemata (see Extended Discussion 
1.3.), this distinction is questionable from an ACT perspective.  Similarly, more 
recent studies and reviews (e.g. Beutler et al. 2002) suggest reactance is a 
specific sub-type of resistance.2  
1.5.2. Reactance and therapeutic change.  A large body of literature 
relates findings on resistance directly to clinical practice, it being broadly 
accepted that a negative relationship exists between resistance and prognosis 
(e.g., Arnow et al. 2003; Beutler et al., 2002; Frank et al., 1998). It has been 
found that clients with higher levels of resistance benefit more from non-
directive and self-directed interventions, whereas low resistance clients profit 
from structured and more directive methods. This trend has especially been 
studied within an alcoholic population (Karno, Beutler & Harwood, 2002; Karno 
& Longabaugh, 2005). Karno and Longabaugh (2007) found that mismatching 
resistance with intervention style significantly predicted more post-treatment 
alcohol consumption, partial matching led to less frequent alcohol use and 
resistance-intervention matching optimised good outcomes.  
Paradoxical interventions, or defiance-based symptom prescriptions, are used 
for highly reactant clients. These involve the therapist actively encouraging the 
problem behaviour, hypothesising that a highly reactive client will reject this 
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advice and do the opposite. Hunsley (1997) found little evidence to support 
these interventions and that their acceptability depended on therapist 
orientation (Hunsley & Lefebvre, 1991). Beutler et al. (2002) more recently 
reported that a growing number of studies confirm they can be effective. Beutler 
and Consoli (1993) report, with case illustration, that these adaptations can be 
carried out through the therapist modifying their interpersonal stance. This 
seemed to be governed largely by directiveness v. client-led spectrum of the 
therapeutic relationship. 
1.5.3. Intrapsychic or interpersonal? Reactance has been found to fit 
both of these categories. Interpersonal conceptualisations tend to correspond 
with cognitive (Arnoff, 2000; Newman, 2002), behavioural (Tompkins, 2002) and 
developmental (Buboltz et al., 2003; Johnson & Buboltz, 2000) literature, 
whereas intrapsychic ideas are more aligned to psychodynamic (Schuller, 1991) 
and personality (Buboltz et al., 2002; Dowd & Wallbrown, 1993) research. 
However, in exploring these differences it should not be insinuated that a 
dichotomous ‗either/or‘ situation exists between interpersonal and intrapsychic 
understandings of resistance. As Beutler et al. (2002) conclude in their review, 
both interpersonal and intrapsychic factors are included in resistance and both 
must be considered in treatment decisions. However, Beutler et al. (2002) do 
not go on to suggest how these factors might interact or how they might relate 
to the inconsistencies outlined above. This research is necessary in order to 
ground this field of research more coherently and comprehensively.  
A possible solution to this problem is to fit interpersonal and intrapsychic 
approaches into a stress-diathesis model: there are individual variations in 
underlying intrapsychic reactance traits (diathesis), which are triggered by 
certain contexts (stress) that lead to states of interpersonal reactance. One 
such context could be therapy. Research to test this or similar hypotheses 
would be beneficial, as it would help lay more solid conceptual foundations for 
this area of study. 
1.5.4. Correlates of reactance. Literature in this area fits broadly into two 
categories: research that considers the developmental and relational variables 
that contribute to the aetiology of reactance, and research exploring which 
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personality variables correlate with it. This literature explains how reactance 
develops and is maintained, and describes the characterological variables that 
relate to it. Findings are summarised in Table 1, Appendix A. However, these 
findings do not appear to test the theorised function of reactance (Dowd & 
Siebel 1996), which may be considered a gap in the research. One aim of the 
current study is to help fill this gap. 
1.5.4.1. Developmental correlates. Johnson and Buboltz (2000) 
examined the relationship between differentiation of self and psychological 
reactance. Differentiation of self refers to the ability to have ―a separate and 
distinct sense of self without reactively cutting off from significant others‖ 
(Johnson & Buboltz, 2000, p.93). It was hypothesised that low levels of 
differentiation would correspond with high reactance, as both involve ‗reactive 
decision-making and an inability to find a healthy balance in intimate 
relationships‘ (Johnson & Buboltz, 2000, p.93). Multiple regression analysis 
revealed that as intergenerational individuation, peer intimacy and peer 
individuation decreased psychological reactance increased. The full model 
significantly predicted reactance as measured by the TRS (Rsqu.=.17, 
F(2,276)=27.84, p<.001) and QMPR (Rsqu.=.17, F(2,276)=28.17, p<.001). 
Buboltz, Johnson and Woller (2003) hypothesised that family dynamics that 
disrupt this balance will relate to the development of psychological reactance. 
Multiple regression showed that five family-of-origin variables had unique 
effects on high reactance: low levels of family conflict (F(1,296)=12.13, p<.001), 
high family cohesion (F(1,296)=10.60, p<.001), high achievement orientation 
(F(1,294)=38.03, p<.001) high family independence (F(1.294)=38.03, p<.01) 
and high levels of moral-religious emphasis (F(1,294)=51.37, p<.001). Finally, a 
t-test revealed that higher reactance, as measured by TRS, existed in divorced 
families (M=53.80, SD=15.55) than intact ones (M=49.19, SD=14.19), t (298) 
=2.15, p<.05.   
1.5.4.2. Personality correlates. Various studies have looked at what 
personality characteristics are associated with psychological reactance, and 
tacitly assume that that these characteristics provide the motivation, or drive, for 
psychological resistance. For instance, Dowd and Wallbrown (1993) 
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operationalised the pattern of human motivation with the Personality Research 
Form (PRF), and found that highly resistant individuals tend to be aggressive, 
dominant, defensive, autonomous and less concerned with how they are 
perceived by others. Buboltz et al. (2003) correlated personality characteristics 
measured by the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) with reactance, and found 
a significant relationship with an interaction effect: ‗thinkers‘ were more resistant 
than ‗feelers‘ and within the former category ‗intuitive-thinkers‘ were more 
resistant than ‗sensing-thinkers.‘ Similar results can be found in Table 8.  
These studies suggest that certain aspects of personality character motivate 
resistance. Moreover, Siebel and Dowd (2001) showed that the relevance of 
personality characteristics to resistance can generalise to a clinical personality 
disorder population, Frank (1998) showed that these trends hold in adolescents 
as well as adults and Seibel and Dowd (1999) demonstrated that these findings 
could be replicated using behavioural rather than cognitive measures. 
However, there are numerous issues that need to be addressed with these 
studies. The majority of studies were carried out on an undergraduate 
population and the information from this sample was used to draw inferences 
about a clinical population. This may not necessarily be valid. Some studies use 
clinical samples thereby overcoming this problem, although one such study 
relates specifically to adolescents (Frank et al., 1998) and another is hampered 
by a small sample (Siebel & Dowd, 2001). Secondly, Arnow et al. (2003) 
investigated the correlation between chronic depression and reactance and 
results showed the opposite pattern of what they had hypothesised: reactance 
positively predicted treatment outcome for chronically depressed patients 
undergoing a cognitive-behavioural analysis system of psychotherapy. This 
suggests that in some instances increased reactance may be conducive to 
mental health, which contradicts findings discussed in 1.8.2. 
Thirdly, different types of personality measures have been used in different 
studies and have never been tested together. Therefore it could be argued that 
we do not know the extent to which personality characteristics are actually 
accounting for the same variation, meaning that different personality 
characteristics do not have a unique relationship with resistance. If so, new 
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studies may not actually be expanding upon, but replicating, previous 
knowledge. However, this criticism may be invalid. Buboltz et al. (2003) 
highlight the fact that evidence in the literature for trait-like aspects of reactance 
is promising but limited, signifying the need to continue to identify and clarify the 
nature of the construct by investigating how it relates to other variables. Both 
they and Dowd and Wallbrown (1993) argue that this methodology is in line with 
that proposed by Cronbach and Meehl (1955), who assert that one way to 
establish construct validity is to establish that construct‘s ‗nomological network,‘ 
i.e. ‗how a newer construct relates to other established constructs‘ (Dowd & 
Wallbrown, 1993, p.533).  
1.5.5. Summary. This overview suggests that, from an ACT perspective, 
the distinction between reactance and resistance is less clear, although the 
literature generally sees reactance as a form of resistance anyway. Findings 
which show reactance to correlate with poorer treatment outcomes and 
psychosocial health validate this view. Exploring reactance as both intrapsychic 
and interpersonal is valid, although applying a stress-diathesis model may 
facilitate exploration of the interactions between these two understandings. 
Developmental and personality correlates of reactance have also been found, 
which grounds it within other concepts and enriches understanding. Limitations 
of this research are also noted.  
Regarding the current study, the major limitation of the reactance literature is 
that its postulated function has not yet been tested. This is, reactance is driven 
by a desire for autonomy. This cardinal element of reactance theory remains 
implicitly assumed. This matter is addressed by the current study, which 
measures reactance within an ACT context. ACT predicts that reactance will be 
used to defend a rigid self concept under conditions of psychological inflexibility, 
and used to pursue valued goals for those with flexible self concepts under 
conditions of high psychological flexibility. Therefore, it hopes to contribute to 
the reactance literature as well as ACT. 
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Table 8: Correlates of reactance and resistance research – findings. 
 
Key: 
Measures of resistance used:  
QMPR=Questionnaire Measuring Personal Resistance 
TRS=Therapeutic Reactance Scale 
TRS-A=Therapeutic Reactance Scale-Adolescent Version 
 
Measures of personality used: 
CPI-R= California Psychological Inventory-Revised 
M-BTI= Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
MMPI-A= Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Adolescent version 
PRF= Personality Research Form 
 
Other measures used: 
FES= Family Environment Scale 
HAMD=Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression 
PAFSQ= Personal Authority in the Family System Questionnaire 
WAI=Working Alliance Inventory 
 
(Table continues over next two pages)
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Study Population  Design Measures  Correlates of reactance Other findings 
Johnson and 
Buboltz, 2000 
College 
Students 
(n=279) 
Regressio
n 
PAFSQ, TRS, 
QMPR 
Levels of individuation from family-of-origin, peer intimacy and peer 
individuation predict the development of psychological reactance 
 
Dowd and 
Wallbrown, 
1993 
Undergraduate 
students 
(n=251) 
Regressio
n 
TRS, QMPR, 
PRF 
Aggressive, dominant, defensive, quick to take offence, and autonomous 
personality variables correlate with high psychological reactance 
TRS a ‗tighter measure‘ of reactance 
than QMPR 
Siebel and 
Dowd, 2001 
Axis II 
Personality 
Disorders (PD) 
(n=80) 
ANOVA TRS, QMPR Personality Disorders (PDs) related to fear of separation correspond to 
low reactance, PDs related to fear of engulfment (or vacillation between 
fear of separation and fear of engulfment) correspond to high reactance 
Individuals without a PD diagnosis 
showed moderate, indicating a balance 
between separation and engulfment 
issues 
Buboltz et al., 
2003 
Undergraduate 
students 
(n=285) 
ANOVA M-BTI, TRS ‗Thinker‘ personality types more reactant than ‗feelers‘, ‗Intuitive-
thinkers‘ personality type interaction more reactant than ‗sensing-thinker‘ 
interaction 
 
Buboltz, 
Johnson and 
Woller, 2003 
Undergraduate 
students 
(n=311) 
Regressio
n 
FES, TRS Family relationship variables (expressed conflict, family cohesion), 
personal growth variables (achievement orientation, independence, 
moral-religious emphasis) and family break-up predict the development 
of psychological reactance 
 
Seibel and 
Dowd (1999) 
Psychotherapy 
client-therapist 
dyads (n=90) 
Regressio
n, factor 
analysis  
Therapist/client 
improvement 
rating, TRS,  
Reactance is negatively associated with global improvement, positively 
with premature termination and not related with medication compliance. 
Reactance is associated with resistant in-session behaviours 
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Frank et 
al.(1998) 
Study 1: 76 
inpatients, 
aged 12-18 
Regressio
n 
TRS-A, MMPI-A Relationships between reactance and personality are similar for 
adolescents as they are for adults. Significant differences between male 
and female reactance profiles 
Reactance predicts therapeutic change 
in middle but not early adolescence. 
Dowd, 
Wallbrown, 
Sanders & 
Yesenosky 
(1994) 
Undergraduate 
students 
(n=326) 
Regressio
n 
CPI-R, TRS, 
QMPR 
Reactant individual characterised by lack of interest in making a good 
impression on others, being somewhat careless about meeting 
obligations, less tolerant of other‘s beliefs, resisting rules and 
regulations, more concerned about problems and the future, more 
inclined to express strong emotions. 
Correlation between reactance and 
concerns about problems and future 
not found in women. Reactant women 
more decisive, sociable and self-
assured than non-reactant women. 
Arnow et al. 
(2003) 
Patients with 
chronic 
depression 
(n=347) 
Factor 
Analysis, 
multiple 
regressio
n 
Structured 
clinical interview 
for DSM-IV, 
HAMD, TRS, 
WAI 
Reactance positively predicted treatment outcome for those undergoing 
CBT on 2 of 4 scales. 
Quality of therapeutic alliance positively 
correlated with outcome, reactance not 
correlated with therapeutic alliance. 
Reactance did not predict outcome in 
medication alone or in combination with 
CBT groups. 
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1.6. Identity literature relating to ACT 
 
ACT hypothesises that fusion to a maladaptive self-as-content a) provides a sense of 
comfort that a client may be unwilling to give up, b) will vary from person to person 
and have different consequences depending on this variation. Literature outside ACT 
relates to both of these claims, and they will now be considered in turn. 
1.6.1. Self-continuity provides a sense of security. ACT‘s position implies 
self-esteem is not the only motive in identity construction, as it can be forfeited by 
clients who defend the continuity of a self-concept that does them harm. Vignoles, 
Regalia, Manzi, Golledge and Scabini (2006) used multilevel regression analysis to 
explore this possibility. They found that people perceive as central to their identity 
those aspects of themselves that provide a greater sense of self-esteem, continuity, 
distinctiveness and meaning. Secondly, they found people were happiest with those 
aspects of themselves that best satisfied motives for self-esteem and efficacy. These 
results were replicated at individual, relational and group levels of identity.  
 
These findings suggest that a person may not be happy with an aspect of 
themselves, but still think of it as central to their self-as-content because it provides a 
sense of self-continuity. Relating this to the current study, this supports the ACT 
position that therapeutic change (which presumably would increase happiness) can 
be forfeited to protect self-as-content, as it fulfils motives other than self-esteem. 
1.6.2. Individual differences in attachment to self-as-content results in 
different consequences. Previous research from a social-cognitive perspective 
indirectly supports ACT‘s hypotheses in this area. Dweck (1999) and colleagues 
have found that people tend to implicitly hold one of two theories about the self, 
despite neither having been formally taught. These theories conceptually map onto 
self-as-content and the observer self. The first is ‗entity‘ theory, which corresponds to 
fusion with self-as-content. Entity theorists hold that who one is is fixed. They portray 
the self as an entity that dwells within us, that cannot be changed. This essence is 
innate, biological or ‗God given.‘ Entity theorists tend to seek confirmatory evidence 
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for a positive self-concept, and avoid or find it hard to deal with evidence for a 
negative self-concept (such as failure, setbacks or criticism). 
 
The second type of self-theorists are labelled ‗incrementalists,‘ or more recently 
‗growth-based‘ theorists, which corresponds to de-fusion from self-as-content. 
Incrementalists believe that the self is fluid, subject to cultivation and development. It 
is not so much of a ‗thing,‘ but more akin to a process. One‘s self can be positively 
changed through one‘s efforts, so that who one is now will not necessarily be who 
one is in the future (in a conceptualised sense). For incrementalists, difficulties, 
setbacks and failures are potential sources of learning, development and self-
improvement. Dweck‘s (1999; p.4) statement that, for incrementalists, ―errors are 
routes to mastery‖ echoes the ACT principle that aversive events provide ―an 
opportunity…through suffering…to learn something‖ (Hayes et al., 2003; p.79).  
The most pertinent findings for the current study come from Zhao, Mueller and 
Dweck (1998). They found that entity theorists who were not depressed (as 
measured by the BDI) reacted to failure in the same way as a group who were 
depressed. Comparing to incremental-theorists, both depressed and entity-theorist 
groups were more likely to see failure as a measure of the self, had a more extreme 
negative reaction to it, and were more likely to let these feelings govern their 
behaviour (e.g. quitting a difficult task). Incremental-theorists, on the other hand, 
were more likely to persist in value-led behaviour despite their negative emotions. 
This is despite the fact they were equally non-depressed than the entity-theorist 
group. If endorsement of an entity self-theory is equivalent to fusion with a 
conceptualised sense of self, this help corroborate ACT‘s findings that greater fusion 
leads to greater negative affect when presented with aversive stimuli, and decreased 
propensity to think about it or take seriously (Healy et al., 2008).  
1.6.3. Summary. In sum, belief in self as a fixed entity (an essential aspect of 
self-as-content) correlates with self-validation and psychopathology, phenomena that 
ACT links to fusion with self-as-content. Belief that the self is a changeable entity (a 
necessary facet of de-fusion from self-as-content) correlates with goal-driven action 
and predicts the absence of psychopathology. Therefore, self-theory research 
appears consistent with ACT, and the concepts of fixed and flexible self-theories 
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map on to rigid and flexible sense of self-as-content. If so, they provide an 
opportunity to empirically test ACT‘s hypotheses regarding the self. The current 
study seeks to take up this opportunity and build on it, by seeing if rigidity of self-
concept correlates with defensiveness in the way proposed by Hayes and Gregg 
(2000). 
1.7. Distinguishing between identity and personality. Identity and personality 
need to be distinguished for the ACT approach to be clear. The field of identity is 
large and confusing (Lewis, 1992), therefore it can only hope be hoped to make this 
distinction for the purposes of the current study, without claiming it to be a more 
objective clarification of the literature.  
 
Fonagy and Higget (1984) acknowledge the lack of consensus within the literature 
when defining personality. They provide a three-fold definition in which these 
debates can be framed. For them, personality is defined as a) the most enduring 
characteristics of behaviour that facilitate a person being recognised as distinct from 
others, b) how these behavioural characteristics are internally organised so that they 
combine into a ‗whole person‘ and c) how this internal organisation of characteristics 
interacts with the external world. For the purposes of the current study, identity can 
be defined as what gives someone the sense of being the same person over time 
(see Perry, 2008). Rather than personality‘s emphasis on what makes a person 
distinctive, identity is concerned with what makes them continuous.  
It is natural for the problem of self-continuity, with which identity is concerned, to 
arise from personality: enduring characteristics provide a sense of being the same 
person over time. Although this is common sense, philosophers have found it to be 
an unsuitable criterion for identity (Parfit, 1984; Perry, 2008). Moreover, cross-
cultural research have found it to be a culture-specific means of conceiving identity 
continuity (e.g. Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003).  
ACT suggests that endorsing personality (which may fall under its notion of self-as-
content) as the only means of identity continuity can lead to therapeutic resistance 
and psychological inflexibility. It suggests an alternative means of establishing 
identity continuity which is independent of personality. This will be returned to in a 
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discussion of ‗self-as-context.‘ Thus, the ACT position on the self rests strongly on 
the ability to distinguish between personality and identity.     
 
Extended Method 
2.1 Participants 
2.1.1. Sample Size. According to Stevens (1999), sufficient power is achieved 
with a ‗large‘ sample size. Pallant (2005) suggests that at least 100 participants 
represents a large sample, assuming there is not an excessive amount of 
independent variables. A minimum sample size of 100 has been used in comparable 
studies into identity (e.g. Vignoles, 2010). Therefore, a sample size of 120 was 
targeted. However, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggest this may not be an 
adequate sample size for factor analysis, 200 being ‗fair‘ and 300 ‗good.‘ Therefore, 
although a factor analysis was carried out on the Therapeutic Reactance Scale its 
results should be treated with extreme caution.  
2.1.2. Demographics. Age, ethnicity and religious categories were derived 
from those used by the Office for National Statistics [ONS] (2008). This was in order 
to compare the current sample with the demographic distribution of the UK. The 
information gained would help inform matters of generalisability. As Grove (2005) 
recommends, data describing the sample should be gathered in order to evaluate for 
possible biases and to contrast with other samples. In order to aid such exploration, 
each demographic question utilised answer options derived from categories in official 
UK government demographic research (ONS, 2008). Additionally, participants were 
given the option to not respond to demographic questions if they did not wish to, so 
that they could maintain privacy if they wished.  
Beliefs surrounding identity and mental health have been found to vary across 
generations and cultures (Kirmayer, 2007). The effect of gender on psychological 
reactance is an established finding within the literature (e.g. Dowd et al., 1994). 
Therefore gender, age, ethnicity, religion and country of birth were all considered 
suitable demographics to measure. 
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2.1.3. Inclusion criteria. 
 Aged over 18 years. The study was aimed at an adult population, and it was 
thought that recruiting participants under 18 might introduce variables not accounted 
for by the study design. Research has shown that therapeutic reactance, for instance, 
correlates with certain developmental factors (Johnson & Buboltz, 2000).  
 Ability to read English. Participants will be asked to complete a tick-box 
questionnaire, the questions and answer options will be in English. Therefore this 
ability is necessary for participants to accurately communicate the information being 
sought. 
 Ability to give informed consent, as this is an ethical requirement for those 
participating in research (Royal College of Nursing [RCN], 2005). 
 Access to the Internet, as the questionnaire was online. In theory, a 
population with Internet access may provide significantly different data from a postal-
accessed population, although Ritter et al. (2004) compared a convenience sample 
of internet vs. mailed participation. The two groups showed no significant differences 
in response or reliability.  
 
In order to assess the inclusion criteria, potential participants had to read an 
introductory page containing some brief information about the questionnaire and the 
options of confirming they were over eighteen and that they gave informed consent 
to take part, by ticking the appropriate boxes. Without confirming these options the 
questionnaire could not be accessed. It was assumed that by ticking the boxes 
participants were aware that they had given informed consent and were over 
eighteen. By being able to navigate this introductory page successfully, it was also 
assumed that participants had the ability to read English that was required to 
complete the main questionnaire.  
2.1.4. Exclusion criteria 
 Knowledge of the hypotheses being studied, as expectations of results based 
on this knowledge may serve to distort the responses given (North et al., 1999). 
 Although not excluded from participation on an a priori basis, participants will 
be asked if they have ever trained or worked in clinical psychology. If this has a 
significant influence on results, it will be accounted for in the analysis.  
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In order to uphold the first exclusion criteria, individuals who had knowledge of the 
hypotheses being tested were not asked to participate. Additionally, a condition was 
written into the email, asking those who had knowledge of the study to not participate. 
Therefore, in these cases the exclusion criteria was relied upon to be upheld by the 
potential participants themselves.  
To uphold the second exclusion criteria, as part of the questionnaire all participants 
were asked whether they had ever studied clinical psychology. This allowed them to 
then be excluded from further analysis if a t-test revealed they gave significantly 
different responses to the non-clinical psychology group. Analysis revealed that there 
was no significant difference between the psychology and non—psychology group.  
This was an important finding, as a significant result would have had repercussions 
for the previous research on which this study was based, as a large proportion of it 
relies upon data provided by psychology students (e.g. Dowd & Wallbrown, 2001). 
2.2. Procedure 
The procedure for the current study is summarized in Figure 4, conceptual stages 
indicated by the dashed boxes. Demographic questions and measures were 
compiled. Precise demographic questions and scale items can be found in the 
appendices. Details of the scales are provided in the journal paper and below. The 
three scales were placed with the longest (Therapeutic Reactance Scale (TRS), 28 
items) in the middle, forming the main body of the questionnaire. Implicit Self Theory 
came before, and the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II was placed after. 
Precise details of the order, structure and content of the questionnaire may be found 
by consulting a copy of it in Appendix B.   
A draft questionnaire was designed at www.surveymonkey.com, and then circulated 
to Kerry Beckley (clinical supervisor) and Roshan das Nair (research supervisor). A 
welcome page was constructed, with contact details, information, informed consent 
and age verification. Wording of demographic items was made more friendly and 
inviting. Items from the three scales were made compulsory, to reduce the risk of 
missing data. A copy of this questionnaire, the research proposal and other 
supporting documentation was then submitted to the Institute for Work, Health and 
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Organisations (I-WHO), University of Nottingham, Ethics Committee. These were 
found appropriate and ethical approval was granted. A poster was subsequently 
constructed to publicise the study and submitted to the Ethics Committee as an 
amendment. After minor corrections this was also approved. Detail of the poster, the 
questionnaire, informed consent and letters from the ethics committee approving 
these issues are provided in appendices D, B, B and E respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When ethical approval for the study was granted, the questionnaire was then 
disseminated to potential participants through the means described in the journal 
paper. Contacted participants were asked to forward details of the study to potential 
participants unknown to the researchers. This snowballing technique was designed 
to access more participants, but also increase their heterogeneity. It was reasoned 
Figure 4. Procedure of study 
Exit questionnaire Conceptual 
process 
Questionnaire 
compiled 
I-WHO Ethical 
approval sought 
Minor 
amendments 
needed 
Ethical approval 
granted 
Potential 
participants 
contacted via 
email 
Potential participants 
contacted via posters  
Potential participants 
access questionnaire 
Meet 
inclusion/exclusion 
criteria – participate 
w. informed 
consent 
Do not meet 
inclusion/exclusion 
criteria: unable to 
participate 
Thanked and 
provided with 
contact details 
Data stored 
anonymously and 
securely 
When N sufficient, 
data analysed 
using SPSS 
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that increasing heterogeneity should reduce bias. Lopes, Rodrigues and Sichieri 
(1996) have shown that this method leads to a lack of selection bias.  
If participants did not confirm that they were over 18 and gave their informed consent 
they were unable to participate. Once participants had completed the questionnaire 
they were thanked for their time. Contact details were provided twice (at beginning or 
completion in the questionnaire) so that participants could ask the research team for 
further information or a copy of the results.  
Responses were held on a secure, password-protected, online database at 
surveymonkey.com. All information was held anonymously, and could not be traced 
back to individual participants. When a sufficient amount of responses had been 
collected (which was calculated to be over 120), data was downloaded from the 
website in the form of an Excel spreadsheet. This spreadsheet was then converted 
into a database using the statistical software package SPSS 16. SPSS 16 was then 
used to analyse the data appropriately for the research question. Details and 
outcomes of this analysis can be found in the results section of the journal article and 
Section 3 of the extended paper. 
2.3 Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval for this study, after the amendments for the publicity poster had 
been made, was granted by the I-WHO Ethics Committee Review, at the University 
of Nottingham, on 26.07.201 0. A copy of the ethical approval letter can be found in 
Appendix E, and supporting documentation is located in Appendices B, C and D.  
2.3.1. Informed consent. Informed consent was necessary for participation to 
be ethical (RCN, 2005). This matter could have presented a difficulty if the 
questionnaire was openly accessible on the internet. Such public open access would 
provide no way of guaranteeing that participants had given their informed consent. 
To overcome this difficulty it was compulsory for a statement of informed consent to 
be agreed to for the questionnaire to be accessed. By doing so, efforts were made to 
deal with this potential limitation, although it cannot be guaranteed completely, as 
there was no means of verifying that the appropriate boxes were ticked correctly. 
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On the introductory ‗Welcome‘ page potential participants were thanked for 
considering taking part, and that the study was part of a Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology from the University of Nottingham. It was explained that the 
questionnaire would ask for their views on a range of topics, particularly how they 
feel about themselves (referring to the Implicit Self-Theory and AAQ-II scales) and 
how they tend to behave when in specific situations (the nature of the TRS). 
Following the protocol of other research into identity (e.g. Vignoles, 2010) they were 
guided to not agonise over the ‗correct‘ answer but go with initial reactions. It was 
stated that the questionnaire would take less than 10 minutes to complete (verified 
by distribution amongst research supervisors).  
A necessary design of the study was for participants to remain unaware of the 
specific hypotheses. For instance, Dweck (1999) cites similar studies in which the 
Implicit Self-Theory measure has no rubric or title. Therefore information had to be 
brief enough to allow this, but enough to meet the standards of informed consent set 
by the I-WHO Ethics Committee. To compensate for this brevity of information, 
contact email addresses were provided, explaining that the research team would be 
happy to answer any further questions a potential participant may have before they 
provide their consent. By taking these measures, the issue of informed consent was 
deemed to have been met by the I-WHO Ethics Committee.  
2.3.2. Risks, burdens and benefits. Risks to the participants were the distress 
that may have been aroused by answering emotionally pertinent questions. In order 
to address this they were reminded of their right to withdraw from the study at any 
time and were provided with the contact details of the researchers, both before and 
after the questionnaire. 
A benefit for participants was an opportunity to take part in research that was 
designed to contribute to the field of clinical psychology, and to learn of its results if 
they wished. The questions provided an opportunity for self-reflection and thought 
that may not otherwise have been available. 
Participants were burdened by the amount of time needed to complete the 
questionnaire, which had been estimated to be less than 10 minutes. Efforts were 
made to make the participation process as easy as possible, providing enough 
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information for informed consent but not too much as to be overly time consuming, 
attempting to make the questionnaire welcoming and user-friendly and providing a 
web address within invitational emails that could be clicked on to take the recipient 
straight to the questionnaire. 
2.4 Measures 
2.4.1.1. - ‘Kind of Person’ Implicit Theory – ‘Self’ Form For Adults. Heslin, 
Latham and Vandewalle (2005) found the internal consistency of this scale to be 
high (=.94). Stroessner, Levy & Dweck (1998) found high across-item reliability 
(Cronbach‘s  = .90). The current measure has replaced a three-item scale that only 
measured entity theory. There was found to be a correlation between these items 
and the newer incremental items of between -.69 and -.86, which is consistent with 
the assumption that endorsement of entity theory is inconsistent with endorsement of 
incremental theory (Dweck, 1999).  
Dweck, Chiu & Hong (1995) found that the self theory measure was related to other 
implicit theory measures in a conceptually meaningful way, but was not correlated to 
lay theories about the fixity v. malleability of the world (e.g. item: ‗our world has basic 
or ingrained dispositions, and you can‘t really change them.‘). This suggests that an 
acquiescence set is not a problem in when assessing lay theories overall. The 
measure was found to be independent of participant‘s age and gender. Regarding 
construct validity, the measure was not confounded by self-presentation concerns 
(measured by the Snyder (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale and Paulhus (1984) Social 
Desirability Scale). Discriminant validity was apparent through a lack of correlation 
with cognitive ability (Scholastic Aptitude Test scores), confidence in intellectual 
ability, self-esteem, optimism regarding the world or other people and social-political 
attitudes (i.e., right-wing authoritarianism, political conservatism, political liberalism). 
However, the self theory measure was not tested against locus of control subscales, 
although other implicit theory measures were. A criticism of Dweck et al.‘s (1995) 
investigations into validity is that they do not explore ecological validity, restricting 
their concerns to pencil-and-paper studies. Dweck (2000) summarises that self 
theories represent assumptions about the self that have behavioural, motivational, 
emotional and cognitive consequences, but that they are distinct from other cognitive 
and motivational constructs.  
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The use of the term ‗implicit‘ in the title of this measure is in need of clarification. 
Firstly, it does not seem that the measure fits the definition of being an implicit 
measure. De However, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt and Moors (2009, p.350) define 
implicit measures as those where the outcome is ―causally produced by the to-be-
measured attribute in the absence of certain goals, awareness, substantial cognitive 
resources, or substantial time.‖ Dweck‘s (2000) measure, in contrast, is a pen-and-
paper based, taking the form of what are usually referred to as explicit measures. It 
relies upon the participant being able to gain access to their psychological 
tendencies through conscious introspection, which cannot pick up information which 
the participant is unconscious of (Roefs et al., 2011). Therefore Dweck‘s (2000) 
measure appears to be better defined as explicit rather than implicit, despite its title. 
However, it is important to remember that a measure being implicit is not an all or 
none category, but one into which measures may fit to greater or lesser degrees 
(Roefs et al., 2011). Roefs et al. (2011) go on to specify that one aspect of the term 
‗implicit‘ refers to the sense in which a person is unaware of the origin of the 
association or does not control the process which leads to the outcome that is being 
measured. This appears to be the sense of ‗implicit‘ to which Dweck (2000) refers in 
her measure. She asserts that she uses the term based upon George Kelly‘s 
personal construct theory, whereby a person holds idiosyncratic and deep-seated 
assumptions about themselves and the world with no knowledge of how they 
acquired them, and having never been formally taught them. Therefore although the 
measure being used appears to be explicit, it seeks to tap into a construct that, from 
a Kellyian perspective, is traditionally referred to as implicit. In sum, it appears that 
the current measure cannot be defined as implicit, but that its use of the word implicit 
refers to the type of belief which it purports to measure.  
2.4.1.2. Justification. This measure was used because it provides a possible 
means of linking the senses of self used in ACT to the wider literature, and 
investigating how they relate to psychological flexibility. Theoretically, a strong self-
as-content fosters an entity theory of the self. It refers to a sense of self that is bound 
to a certain self-image, concept or belief that one is fused to (Luoma et al., 2006). 
Therefore it is strongly held, not easily subject to change over time, an attitude which 
should be reflected by an entity implicit theory of the self: fundamentally, one stays 
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the same over time. Conversely, a strong sense of observing self entails a flexible 
theory of the self. An observing self refers to a sense of self that arises from being 
aware of oneself in the present moment (Luoma et al., 2006). As the circumstances 
of the present moment are in perpetual flux, motion and evolution (Chandler et al., 
2003), this should support a sense of self that is more fluid, open, flexible and 
contingent on present circumstances. These characteristics would chime with a 
flexible self-theory: one is capable of fundamental change over time (Dweck, 1999). 
Moreover, using this measure is justified as it quantifies, within a self-report format, 
two concepts that have been subject to a large body of varied and wide-ranging 
research. Other measures of these concepts have either been qualitative (e.g. 
Verkuyten, 2005), more time-consuming thus compromising ability to reach requisite 
sample size (e.g. Chandler et al., 2003), focused on group rather than individual 
identity (e.g. Sani & Bowe, in press), or concentrated on entity theory alone, without 
an incremental counterpart (Rothi, Lyons & Chryssochoou, 2005). Moreover, Zhao, 
Mueller and Dweck (unpublished manuscript, cited in Dweck 1999) have shown that 
the current measures predict self-esteem loss and depressive reactions to negative 
events, implicating their potential relevance to clinical psychology and therapy in a 
way that other measures have not (e.g. Pehrson, Brown & Zagefka, 2009). The 
hypothesized relationships between SX, SC and psychological flexibility have not 
been empirically tested, and the current measure provides a unique opportunity to do 
so. 
2.4.2.1 Therapeutic Reactance Scale. Dowd et al. (1991) report convergent 
validity established by correlating TRS scores with the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI) K-scale (negative correlation of -.27, p<.005)  and the 
Rotter External Locus of Control Scale (correlation with internality of .35, p<.0005). 
As well as correlations with overall TRS scores, the ‗behavioural‘ factor appeared to 
have stronger correlations than the ‗verbal‘ factor. Qualitatively, these findings 
suggest high TRS scores relate to a lessened desire to impress or be socially 
appropriate.  
 Divergent validity was supposedly established with a lack of correlation between the 
TRS and Counselor Rating Form-Short, the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) 
(p=.11 for State, p=.06 for Trait) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (p=.11). 
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However, considering the arbitrary nature of the p<.05 cut-off (Field, 2009), it is 
rather dubious to judge the Trait aspect of the STAI as wholly unrelated. Moreover, 
there was a significant correlation between the Counselor Attractiveness subscale 
and the behavioural reactance subscale (r=.21, p<.05) on the Counselor Rating 
Form-Short.  
Construct validity was also reported in relation to directive therapeutic interventions 
and counseling supervision. Beutler, Moleiro and Talebi (2002; p.212) report that the 
TRS provides ―predictive validity on the differential efficacy of directive and 
nondirective treatment.‖ Beutler et al. (2002) conclude that the TRS is the best 
known-measure of resistant traits currently used in psychological research, and it is 
designed to reflect cross-situational traits rather than only situational states. 
2.4.2.2. Justification. Beutler et al. (2002) conclude that the TRS is the best 
known-measure of resistant traits currently used in psychological research, and it is 
designed to reflect cross-situational traits rather than only situational states. Further 
to this, reactance is regarded as a mechanism for preserving one‘s sense of self 
(Dowd & Siebel, 1990). These reasons made it better suited to a study regarding 
people‘s longstanding sense of self.  
The Questionnaire for Measuring Psychological Reactance (QMPR; Merz, 1983) 
was originally a German-language predecessor of the TRS, which has been 
translated into English. It has a single factor solution, with Dowd, Wallbrown, 
Sanders and Yesenosky finding a .53 correlation with the TRS. It is no longer as 
widely used as the TRS in current research; therefore it appeared more appropriate 
to use the latter in this study. The other specific measure of trait-like resistance 
(Systematic Treatment Selection Clinician Rating Form, STS-CRF, Fisher, Beutler & 
Williams, 1999) was for clinicians to fill in rather than self-report, which was not 
appropriate for the context of the current project.  
Beutler et al. (2002) suggest another approach was to use a mixture of subscales 
drawn from various multidimensional personality tests whose content suggests they 
measure resistant traits. However, this approach seems more speculative, less 
coherent and without a surrounding research context to which this study could relate, 
therefore the TRS seemed more apt. 
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2.4.3.1. Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II). Bond et al. 
(submitted) established the AAQ-II‘s psychometric properties across a total of 3,280 
participants from seven samples. The mean score for university students and 
community samples was 50.72 (SD=9.19), and for a sample seeking treatment for 
substance misuse it was 39.80 (SD=12.55). The mean alpha coefficient across the 
seven samples was .83 (.76 – .87). Factor analyses derived a single factor solution.  
Bond et al. (submitted) then used data from 2, 816 participants across six samples to 
investigate the concurrent, predictive, discriminant and convergent validities of the 
AAQ-II. For the measure to have concurrent and predictive validities, low 
psychological flexibility should relate to greater emotional distress and poorer life 
functioning. Data supported this prediction, with low psychological flexibility being 
associated with depressive symptoms (using the Beck Depression Inventory-II and 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS)), anxiety symptoms (Beck Anxiety 
Inventory, DASS), stress (DASS) and overall psychological ill-health (General Health 
Questionnaire-12 (GHQ) and Global Severity Index of the Symptom Checklist-90-
Revised). Statistically significant variations between samples negated the possibility 
of common method variance explaining these results, rather than predictive validity. 
Furthermore, low psychological flexibility predicted greater psychological distress 
(GHQ) one year later, and more incidences of absence from work over that year, 
lower sales figures and less ability to learn a new computer software system (using 
absentee records rather than self-report). Using both objective behavioural and self-
report measures further undermined a common method variance alternative 
explanation.  
Regarding convergent validity, the AAQ-II was expected to correlate with measures 
of thought suppression (White Bear Suppression Inventory), but not so highly as to 
suggest they measure the same construct. Data suggested this to be the case, as 
well as evidencing divergent validity in that the AAQ-II was not significantly 
associated with social desirability. This suggests that participants did not feel 
compelled to answer the AA-II in a culturally acceptable or appropriate manner. 
Moreover, the AAQ-II was not associated with age, gender or ethnicity. It did 
correlate highly with its predecessor the AAQ-I (correlation of .97), suggesting they 
measure the same construct.  
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2.4.3.2. Justification. The AAQ-II was used because it was specifically 
designed to measure psychological flexibility, an understanding of mental health and 
its psychological treatment employed within ACT (Luoma et al., 2006). The only 
other measure of this construct, the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-I (AAQ-II) 
(Hayes et al., 2004), had insufficient alpha levels, the reasons for which have been 
addressed by the AAQ-II. Thus, Bond et al. (submitted) recommend that using the 
AAQ-II is psychometrically ‗safer.‘ However, as this measure is so new it has not 
been verified by researchers other than those responsible for developing it. As it 
becomes a more widely used tool Bond et al.‘s (submitted) psychometric findings 
need to be replicated in order for its properties to become more well-established.  
Extended Results 
3.1 Descriptives and assumptions of normality 
Z-scores for kurtosis and skew suggested that the assumption of normal distribution 
on each of the three variable scales was met (Self-theory: skew = 0.88 kurtosis = 
0.35; Reactance: skew = 0.36, kurtosis = 1.01; Psychological Flexibility: skew = 0.04; 
kurtosis = 1.04), as did non-significant Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov scores, however, were significant (p<.05) for implicit self-theory 
and psychological flexibility, suggesting a non-normal distribution. Pallant (2005) 
suggests that it is common for Kolmogorov-Smirov to report Type I errors for larger 
samples. Considering that the normal curve of the histograms suggested a normal 
distribution, along with the other indicators described, it was assessed that the 
assumption of normality was met. Descriptive statistics for each variable are 
provided in Table 9 overleaf. 
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics for three scales used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Construct N Min. Max
. 
Mean Std. 
Deviation  
Z-score 
Skew 
Z-score 
kurtosis 
Kolmogov-
Smirnov 
Shapiro-
Wilk 
Experiential Avoidance 172 29 68 48.56 7.77 0.04 1.04 .001 .13 
Sense of Self 172 8 45 28.84 7.32 0.88 0.35 .06 .36 
Reactance 172 51 86 68.52 6.39 0.36 1.01 .04 .52 
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3.2 Grouping variables  
3.2.1. Sense of Self. Dweck (1995) and Levy, Stroessner and Dweck (1998) 
suggest two methods for creating categorical fixed v. flexible groupings from the 
continuous implicit self-theory measure: a) a median split and b) removing scores 
which lie 0.5 points or less above and below the mean. Method b) was found to be 
unsuitable for the current study. Dweck (1995) found this technique to remove only 
10-15% of the sample. However, this technique removed 74 (43%) of the current 
sample, which had two unwanted consequences. It reduced power to below the 
intended level and, by systemic exclusion of a targeted segment of participants, 
produced an artificial representation of the sample. Therefore this method was not 
used.  
Regarding method a), two reasons made it unsuitable for the current study. Firstly, 
median split techniques have received much criticism for falsely dichotomising 
continuous variables (e.g. Field, 2009), as they can inaccurately reflect differences 
between groups that are not naturally present. Secondly, the median split technique 
was used for research without a clinical focus (e.g. Levy et al., 1998), whereas the 
current study is clinically oriented. Clinical psychology tends to focus on more 
extreme cases of normally distributed phenomena (e.g. depression, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, social phobia). Median split technique ‗washes out‘ these more 
extreme points by grouping them with that half of the normal curve.  
Therefore a more appropriate technique for grouping the implicit self-theory variable 
was to create three groups, divided by +/- 1 standard deviation from the mean. This 
grouping technique had three major advantages: a) it better reflected a normal 
distribution, b) supported a clinical focus c) retained the full sample. The three 
groups created were Fixed (n=30), Mixed (118) and Flexible (24) senses of self. 
3.2.2 Experiential Avoidance. The same technique was used for creating 
experiential avoidance groups, using the same rationale. The three groups created 
were Low (27), Moderate (117) and High (28) Experiential Avoidance. 
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3.3 Correlational Analysis 
Age and gender have been found to be relevant variables in relation to reactance. 
Therefore a Pearson product-moment correlation was performed to assess whether 
their effects would be needed to be partialled out in the main analysis. Knowledge of 
clinical psychology and religious beliefs were also thought to be potentially relevant 
in these matters. As other potential co-variates, they were also included in the 
correlational analysis. Experiential avoidance and self-theory were included in both 
continuous and grouped form, as correlational analysis is primarily geared towards 
assessing continuous variables (Pallant, 2005), and we wanted to assess what effect 
grouping may have had on the relation between these variables and the others in the 
study. Results of the Pearson product-moment correlation are shown below. 
Preliminary analyses were performed to ensure no violation of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. The only correction was for age, which 
was negatively skewed. A log transformation was completed to meet this assumption. 
Correlational analysis showed predicted correlations between overall reactance and 
its sub-factors, as defined by Bulboltz et al. (2003). The predicted correlations also 
appeared for the continuous and grouped versions of the experiential avoidance 
(r=.86) and self-theory (r=.87) variables, both at p<.01 level. Beyond these, overall 
reactance and gender (r=-.30), resentment of authority and gender (r=-.30), 
resentment of authority and grouped self-theory (r=-.21) and resentment of authority 
and grouped experiential avoidance (r=-.24) were all significant at p<.01 level. Self-
theory (continuous) and knowledge of clinical psychology (r=.17), resentment of 
authority and Self-theory (continuous) (r=-.16), susceptibility and self-theory 
(grouped) (r=.17) and conflict avoidance and gender (r=-.17) correlated significantly 
at p<.05 level. No correlation between the independent variables was found, 
affirming their suitability for ANOVA (Pallant, 2005). The correlation between gender 
and the dependent variable suggested that it should be treated as a co-variate. This 
would be necessary to partial out its effect on the dependent variable, in order to 
accurately detect the impact of the independent variables. Thus, an ANCOVA was 
deemed the most suitable method for the main analysis. 
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Table 10: Pearson product-moment correlation matrix [*=significant at .05 level (2-tailed), **=significant at .01 level (2-tailed)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Age 1             
2. Gender .11 1            
3.Religiousity -.13 -.03 1           
4.Psych. knowledge -.02 -.12 .04 1          
5.Self (continuous) -.05 .01 -.10 .17* 1         
6.Self (grouped) -.07 .01 -.03 .12 .87** 1        
7.Avoidance (continuous) .03 .08 .13 -.01 -.03 -.03 1       
8.Avoidance (grouped) -.06 .08 .06 -.07 -.05 -.04 .86** 1      
9.Reactance -.07 -.30** -.11 .06 -.03 -.10 .02 -.10 1     
10.Resent Authority .07 -.30** -.07 .08 -.16* -.21** -.11 -.24** .73** 1    
11.Susceptibility .07 -.06 -.03 -.03 -.08 .17* -.04 .13 .47** .11 1   
12.Conflict avoidance .11 -.17* -.07 .01 -.01 .03 .05 .02 .27** .17* .14 1  
13.Freedom preservation -.13 .11  -.06 -.03 -.11 -.01 -.06 -.02 .48** .21** .26** -.07 1 
0910, C85RES, Research Project Report, UofN:4092614, UoL:08127520,Page 78 of 122 
 
 
3.4 Factor Analysis 
The 28 items of the Therapeutic Reactance Scale (TRS) were subjected to principal 
components analysis (PCA). Prior to performing PCA the suitability of the data for 
factor analysis was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the 
presence of many significant coefficients of .3 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
value was .87, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1970, 1974). 
Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance, supporting the 
factorability of the correlation matrix. 
PCA revealed the presence of ten components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, 
explaining 61.99% of the variance in total. Respectively, each component (in 
descending order) contributed the following amount: 15.01%, 8.18%, 6.89%, 6.66%, 
5.59%, 4.27%, 4.17%, 3.77%, 3.75% and 3.62%. An inspection of the screeplot 
revealed clear breaks after the second, fifth and seventh component, suggesting that 
a two, five or seven-factor solution would be most appropriate. A five-factor solution 
appeared a promising means of striking a balance between parsimony and 
explanation of variance, the essential consideration of factor analysis (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). The results of Parallel Analysis further supported this. It showed that 
five components with eigenvalues exceeding the corresponding criterion value (1) 
would be produced for a randomly generated data matrix of equal size (172 
respondents x 28 variables). 
To aid the interpretation of these five components, Varimax rotation was performed. 
The rotation revealed a structure with cross-loading of six items. However, as these 
items each loaded most strongly onto one factor with values exceeding .32, they 
were retained (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The five-component solution explained a 
total of 42.40% of the variance, the contribution of each respective component being 
11.40%, 9.09%, 9.07%, 6.98% and 5.88%.  
The interpretation of five components was inconsistent with previous factor analyses 
of the TRS, the original paper by Dowd et al. (1991), and a further study by Bulboltz 
et al. (2003). The chosen factors share some similarities with those found by Bulboltz 
et al. (2003). Current findings replicate their conclusion that ―reactance seems at 
best represented as a multidimensional construct that cannot be adequately 
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assessed by a single dimension‖ (p.124), and pursues their recommendation for 
further research to confirm or disconfirm their findings. Bulboltz et al. (2003) advise 
that their findings be used with caution, as their sample (N=882) comprised of 
college students, who may display reactance differently to other samples. The mean 
reactance of this study (68.52) fell between that of Dowd et al.‘s original study (66.68) 
and Bulboltz et al.‘s (2003) factor analysis (70.7). Bulboltz (2003) explained such 
differences through geographical and cultural factors. As the first use of the TRS in 
the UK and with a non-student population, such factors may also explain the 
differences found in the current study. However, Tachachnick and Fidell (2001) 
counsel that the present sample size (172) would be at best marginally adequate for 
a factor analysis, 100 being ‗poor,‘ 200 ‗fair‘ and 300 ‗good.‘ Therefore, the results of 
the present analysis cannot be regarded as reliable.  
 
Figure 5: Scree-plot from Principal Components Analysis  
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Table 11: Parallel Analysis Matrix. 
Component 
number 
Actual eigenvalue 
from PCA 
Criterion value from 
parallel analysis 
Decision 
1 4.221 1.8339 Accept 
2 2.291 1.7111 Accept 
3 1.929 1.6080 Accept 
4 1.866 1.5272 Accept 
5 1.566 1.4534 Accept 
6 1.197 1.3907 Reject 
7 1.168 1.3313 Reject 
8 1.055 1.2689 Reject 
9 1.050 1.2123 Reject 
10 1.014 1.1627 Reject 
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Table 12:  Unrotated Factor Loadings                   
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I find that I often have to question authority. .716          
If I am told what to do, I often do the opposite. 
.623   
-
.362 
      
I resent authority figures who try to tell me what to 
do. 
.569     
-
.428 
    
Nothing turns me on as much as a good 
argument! 
.548          
I enjoying playing "devil's advocate' whenever I 
can. 
.533 
-
.327 
       
-
.356 
It would be better to have more freedom to do 
what I want on a job. 
.532          
I consider myself more competitive than 
cooperative. 
.513          
I am very stubborn and set in my ways. .513          
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I enjoy seeing someone else do something that 
neither of us is supposed to do. 
.468  
-
.449 
       
I enjoy "showing up" people who think they are 
right. 
.419  
-
.344 
  .386     
I have a strong desire to maintain my personal 
freedom. 
.384 
-
.330 
  .318   .337  .345 
I enjoy debates with other people. 
 
-
.617 
        
I am not very tolerant of others' attempts to 
persuade me. 
 .549         
I am sometimes afraid to disagree with others. 
 
-
.518 
.315        
If someone asks a favour of me, I will think twice 
about what this person is really after. 
 .470    .371   
-
.342 
 
I don't mind other people telling me what to do. 
 .401    
-
.362 
  .328  
In discussions, I am easily persuaded by others.   .648        
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I often follow the suggestions of others   .648        
I usually go along with other's advice. .360  .454        
It is important to me to be in a powerful position 
relative to others. 
   .566       
It does upset me to change my plans because 
someone in the group wants to do something else. 
.351   .478    
-
.341 
  
It is very important for me to get along well with 
the people I work with. 
   
-
.475 
 .316  
-
.369 
 .330 
It really bothers me when police officers tell people 
what to do. 
.442   
-
.472 
      
If I receive a lukewarm dish at a restaurant, I make 
an attempt to let that be known. 
    .605   
-
.397 
  
I don't mind doing something for someone even 
when I don't know why I'm doing it. 
    .445 .336     
I am very open to solutions to my problems from 
others. 
    
-
.316 
 .592    
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I feel it is better to stand up for what I believe than 
to be silent. 
 
-
.311 
  .393  .420  .409  
I am relatively opinionated 
.335 
-
.403 
      
-
.467 
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Table 13: Rotated Factor loading s using Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 
If I am told what to do, I often do the opposite. .734     
I find that I often have to question authority. .733     
It really bothers me when police officers tell people what to do. .664     
I resent authority figures who try to tell me what to do. .622     
It would be better to have more freedom to do what I want on a job. .511     
I enjoy seeing someone else do something that neither of us is supposed 
to do. 
.417   
-
.381 
 
I have a strong desire to maintain my personal freedom. .389  .320  .310 
It does upset me to change my plans because someone in the group 
wants to do something else. 
 .658    
I don't mind other people telling me what to do.  .572    
It is important to me to be in a powerful position relative to others.  .562   .341 
I am not very tolerant of others' attempts to persuade me.  .548 -   
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.337 
I consider myself more competitive than cooperative.  .540    
I am very stubborn and set in my ways.  .512    
I enjoy "showing up" people who think they are right. 
 .362  
-
.309 
 
I enjoy debates with other people.   .672   
I am sometimes afraid to disagree with others.   .575   
I enjoying playing "devil's advocate' whenever I can.   .574   
Nothing turns me on as much as a good argument!   .550   
I am relatively opinionated   .541   
If someone asks a favour of me, I will think twice about what this person 
is really after. 
  
-
.353 
  
I often follow the suggestions of others    .658  
I usually go along with other's advice.    .628  
In discussions, I am easily persuaded by others.    .549  
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It is very important for me to get along well with the people I work with. .344   .458  
If I receive a lukewarm dish at a restaurant, I make an attempt to let that 
be known. 
    .631 
I feel it is better to stand up for what I believe than to be silent.     .511 
I don't mind doing something for someone even when I don't know why 
I'm doing it. 
    .467 
I am very open to solutions to my problems from others. 
    
-
.330 
% of variance explained 11.40 9.09 9.07 6.98 5.88 
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3.5. ANCOVA assumptions 
3.5.1. Unequal sample size and missing data. Data was complete for all 
variables except gender, for which one case was missing. This missing data was 
distributed randomly, and was excluded from subsequent analysis. Sample sizes in 
each cell varied as they were distributed naturally rather than randomly, reflecting 
the non-experimental nature of the study. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) highlight that unequal numbers of scores in factorial 
design lead to ambiguity regarding whether the marginal mean represents the mean 
of means or the mean of scores, and the total sum of squares for all effects is 
greater than that provided by the statistical output. Thus, tests for main effects and 
interactions do not remain dependent.  
To overcome this difficulty, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggest a first strategy to 
be randomised removal of cases from over-populated cells. However, this distorts 
the normally distributed pattern of cell population found in non-experimental research, 
creating an artificially homogenous inter-cell distribution that does not generalise to 
the wider population. Therefore, this approach was not deemed appropriate for the 
current study. Instead, Method 2 described by Overall and Spiegel (1969) was used, 
which is recommended for non-experimental studies. This recommends altering the 
syntax command in SPSS General Linear Model from METHOD=SSTYPE(3) to 
METHOD=SSTYPE(1). This adjustment weights cells with larger samples more 
heavily when computing marginal means and interactions, guarding against the 
potential hazards described. 
3.5.2. Within-cell outliers. Preliminary analysis revealed that there were no 
outliers for the Psychological flexibility or psychological reactance variables. 
However, two outliers were detected at the lower-end of the implicit self-theory scale. 
These were indicated by the histogram and boxplot, and confirmed as genuine after 
checking that 8 (the outlying score) was a genuinely possible score on this scale. 
Inspection of the Extreme values table indicated that after the two outliers of eight, 
the next most extreme score was 13, after which scores sloped smoothly upwards.  
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) recommend that it should first be checked whether 
outliers are a result of researcher error in data entry, or whether they represent a 
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different population from the one intended to be sampled. If so, the error should 
either be rectified or the cases removed from the sample. Neither researcher error 
nor a justification for how these cases could represent a different population could be 
found, therefore the third strategy was utilised. As the actual numbers of such scale 
scores represent what they measure in a fairly arbitrary way (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001), scores which are distinct and removed from the range used by other cases 
can be corrected to one more, or less, than the second most extreme score. This 
way such cases still represent the most extreme viewpoints, but on a scale 
congruent with the rest of the sample. In line with this reasoning, the 2 implicit self-
theory outlying scores were changed from 8 to 13. However, the small difference 
between the mean and 5% trimmed mean suggests (28.84 v. 28.90) that these 
outliers may have had a fairly limited influence on the data if left un-corrected 
(Pallant, 2005). 
3.5.3. Normality. Z-scores for kurtosis and skew suggested that the 
assumption of normal distribution on each of the three measured variables was met, 
as did non-significant Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
scores, however, were significant (p<.05) for implicit self-theory and psychological 
flexibility, suggesting a non-normal distribution (see Table 9). However, Pallant (2005) 
suggests that it is common for Kolmogorov-Smirov to report Type I errors for larger 
samples. Considering that the normal curve of the histograms suggested a normal 
distribution, along with the other indicators described, it was assessed that the 
assumption of normality was met. 
3.5.4. Homogeneity of variance. This assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was met according to the Levene‘s test, which was non-significant. 
3.5.5. Within-cell linearity. This assumption requires linearity between co-
variates (in this case gender) and the dependent variable (reactance), and between 
co-variates if there is more than one. As ―variable with two levels have only linear 
relationships with other variables‖ (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, p.101-102), and 
gender has two levels (male v. female), the assumption of linearity was met. Only 
one co-variate used used, therefore the assumption of non-correlation between 
covariates was met. 
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3.5.6. Homogeneity of regression. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
revealed that there was no interaction effect between the co-variate and either 
independent variable, when predicting the level of the dependent variable. Therefore, 
the assumption of homogeneity of regression was met. 
3.5.7. Reliability of the co-variate. ANCOVA assumes that co-variates are reliably 
measured (Pallant, 2005). As gender is regarded to be a highly reliable variable to 
measure (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), this assumption was assessed to be met. 
 
Extended discussion 
The sections of this section are designed to mirror those of the journal article. The 
nature of these discussions means that scientific (4.3 & 4.4), ethical (4.5), theoretical 
(4.1. & 4.2.) and philosophical (4.5 & 4.6.) issues are discussed, with considerable 
overlap between them. 
4.1 Context of previous research 
It is difficult to explore the current findings through previous ACT literature on the 
subject of the self and therapeutic resistance as, beyond the main texts (e.g. Hayes 
et al., 1999) or conceptual papers (e.g. Hayes, 1984) not much previous research on 
this specific aspect of ACT exists, as far as we are aware. Hayes et al. (2006) 
similarly concluded that there is a dearth of research on specific ACT processes 
such as self-as-content/context, barring de-fusion and acceptance. Of course all six 
processes interrelate, as depicted in Figure 1 (Luoma et al., 2006). However, 
discussing the current findings from the perspective of all of these processes would 
be too generalised for our present purposes. 
Considering these difficulties, the current findings will be discussed through previous 
work on this subject in other modalities. This chimes with an ACT approach, which 
does not regard itself as a wholly novel form of psychotherapy, but more as a 
crucible in which common elements of other modalities (e.g. cognitive, gestalt, 
behavioural, existential) are brought together and understood through common 
processes (Hayes et al., 2004). Furthermore, Extended Background 1.6. serves to 
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put the current findings into the context of previous research into implicit self-theories 
and identity literature, which has come to comparable conclusions.   
Dowd and Siebel (1990) suggest that attempts to alter or intervene with the self-
defining behaviours and cognitions of reactant clients is likely to provoke only more 
reactance, not therapeutic change. They state that a limited range of self-concepts 
restricts the client‘s ability to see themselves in different ways, and ability to engage 
in a diverse range of behaviour patterns. The importance of conceptualised selves in 
matters of freedom and possibility is supported by Cinnirella (1998).  
This lack of internal autonomy or freedom may be externally compensated for 
through reactance. However, using reactance to achieve independence and 
autonomy from others indiscriminately may be self-defeating in a broader sense. 
This is exemplified, write Dowd and Siebel (1990; p.462), through ―I want what I want, 
and not what you want, even if what you want is what I want‖ (emphasis added). 
Therefore a therapist‘s expressed desire to change or alter maladaptive elements of 
a reactant client‘s already vulnerable and threatened self-concept is likely to be met 
with opposition, rejection and an even more dogged clinging to these self-elements 
(Karno, Beutler & Harwood, 2002). [For a critique of the empirical basis of these 
findings on reactance, see Extended Background 1.5.] 
Erikson (1968) labels these elements ‗identity resistance‘ and illustrates them in 
terms of the therapeutic relationship. He suggests that a patient with a vulnerable 
sense of self will be fearful of the therapist imposing their own beliefs and personality 
within sessions, to the extent that theirs is marginalised and lost. They may then act 
to defend this perceived-to-be-threatened sense of self, becoming hyper-vigilant to 
messages of threat or domination from the therapist, and being unwilling to comply. 
The therapist must be aware of signs for this dynamic in the therapeutic relationship, 
and help bring it into conscious awareness. If not, both parties would unconsciously 
slip into these roles and the client‘s difficulties would perpetuate.  
An Object Relations approach recognises that a stable self-concept provides a 
sense of safety and security that therapeutic change cannot (Leiper & Maltby, 2004). 
Individuals who repeatedly reprise the role of the ‗abused spouse,‘ for instance, may 
suffer the distress inherent within such a destructive relationship, but are provided 
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with ―a subtle sense of safety and connection that is experienced as sustaining who 
[they] are‖ (Leiper and Maltby, 2004; p.109). This, according to Personal Construct 
Theory, fulfils the need to predict things and anticipate future events (Dweck, 1999). 
Clinging on to self-as-content and maintaining the interpretations, behaviours and 
relationships it involves (even if these negate the possibility of alleviating distress) 
fulfils this deep-seated need. This theoretical work has been given empirical support 
through research into the motives for identity construction [see Extended 
Background 1.6.1.]  
 
These ideas are consistent with ACT‘s characterisation of self-as-content as a 
source of therapeutic resistance, such characteristics gaining empirical support in 
the current study.  
4.2. Clinical implications 
  4.2.1. Process over content.  In a similar vein to 4.1, cross-theoretical support for 
an emphasis of process over content can be discerned across modalities. Leiper and 
Maltby (2004) suggest that from a psychodynamic perspective,  
―The ability to change, to respond flexibly to life‘s circumstances in 
adaptive and creative ways is probably a good definition of a healthy state 
of being. The capacity for further change becomes the goal of change in 
psychotherapy!                                                                                       (p.4) 
This emphasis on flexible adaptation to the present moment can be understood in 
evolutionary terms, in that it allows information from the environment to be 
processed and transformed into thoughts/feelings/behaviours that function as 
solutions to presenting problems. Thus, it equates to an individual adapting and 
changing in accordance with what is most beneficial in the current environment, 
disengaging with old patterns of being that are no longer effective (Confer et al., 
2010).  Psychodynamic approaches emphasise the importance of process and 
implicit emotion over the actual events being talked about. This is especially 
apparent within an existentialist framework, in which all manner of emotion-laden 
content may as implicit processes surrounding the four existential themes of death, 
freedom, isolation and meaninglessness (Yalom, 1980). 
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The current findings suggest that these concerns are reflected in ACT‘s position on 
self-as-content, and are especially pertinent when dealing with the characteristics 
identified in hypothesis 1. 
4.2.2. Flexibility over self-esteem. A more specific variant of the juxtaposition 
of process and content (4.2.1) is that of self-esteem and psychological flexibility. 
Pyszcynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt and Schimel (2004) reviewed the theoretical 
and empirical literature on self-esteem. They defined it as a person‘s evaluation of 
themselves, which they are inclined to maintain as positive, and defend when 
threatened. Meta-analysis suggested that the most empirically supported theory of 
anxiety is ‗terror management theory,‘ which explains self-esteem‘s function as a 
defensive buffer against the existential terror derived from the uniquely human 
awareness of mortality. Pyszcynski et al. (2004) propose that the sophisticated 
cognitive abilities which make us aware of death are used to construct defences 
against it in the form of self-esteem. 
ACT proposes that when people come to therapy, these cognitive abilities are no 
longer functioning as an adequate defence or coping strategy, but such attempts 
have become part of the problem. Therefore using therapy to pursue self-esteem 
buys into the problem‘s underlying assumption that cognitive abilities – and the self-
concept they construct – are also the only solution (Luoma et al., 2006). ACT‘s 
proposed alternative of psychological flexibility is not grounded on this assumption, 
as aversive events are experienced without defence, and valued goals committed to 
despite them. Therefore, there is no focus on facilitating a person‘s positive 
evaluation of a static self-concept (Pyszcynski et al.‘s (2004) usual definition of self-
esteem), but on external, value-based activity instead. This re-conceptualises self-
esteem in dynamic, growth-based terms consistent with Rogers (1958). Instead, self-
esteem is re-framed as ―a positive way of experiencing yourself when you are fully 
engaged and are using your abilities to the utmost in pursuit of something you value‖ 
(Dweck, 2000; p.4).  
It would be interesting to see how this sense of self-esteem, where the importance of 
the self dissolves and focus on external activity is heightened, compares to the 
concept of flow (Carr, 2004). The current study has found that endorsement of a 
flexible and dynamic, rather than positive and fixed, sense of self correlates with high 
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value-based action at high levels of psychological flexibility. This is more consistent 
with Dweck‘s (2000) definition of self-esteem rather than Pyszcynski et al.‘s (2004) 
as well as the ACT model. Crocker and Nuer (2004) highlight some of these issues 
in their critique of Pyszcynski et al.‘s (2004) review. Although the connection 
between flow and the ideas of the current study are only touched on briefly here, 
they would make an interesting area of future research. 
4.3. Critique of weaknesses and limitations.  
4.3.1. Small clinical sample. The methodology employed was to define 
clinically relevant populations from a non-clinical population. This was pursued as 
not doing so would limit the clinical bias of the study. Moreover, it was necessary to 
test ACT‘s theory within the realm of a non-clinical group, as one of its foundational 
concepts is that the processes causing ‗abnormal‘ psychopathology are common to 
all. Using this methodology, however, led to small cell sizes for those who displayed 
clinically relevant behaviour. This limitation was compensated for statistically, and 
the lack of power (Pallant, 2005) did result in Type II error. However, the limited 
sample who displayed the characteristics hypothesised by ACT means that it would 
be very useful to replicate the current findings within relevant populations. Siebel and 
Dowd‘s (1996) investigation into reactance levels within forms of personality disorder 
suggests these may be relevant groups.   
4.3.2. Complexity of self. A related limitation if this design was that it did not 
investigate these processes in the majority of people falling within the moderate 
range of psychological flexibility, or the mixed range of self-theory. However, this 
process – involving the relation between self-theory, reactance and psychological 
flexibility – may be too simplistic to be meaningful for the majority. As such a broad 
range of individual differences and variables are present within the realm of 
personality, the effect of self-rigidity – as one form of identity variable – and 
reactance – as one form of self-defence – may appear irrelevant amongst the 
competing clamour of other considerations. Its effect may only be apparent when it is 
most pronounced.  
4.3.3. Accessibility of the self. Another limitation of the study lies in the extent 
to which the self as a phenomenological experience can be accessed. This study 
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used Likert-scale measures to attempt to gain an impression of something inherently 
private and inaccessible to others. As Kanter et al. (2001) stress, this is inadequate 
and can never provide direct or truly empirical investigation of the self. Indeed, from 
a behavioural perspective being pre-occupied will such elusive private events may 
be an ultimately fruitless and ineffective endeavour. Therefore this study was limited 
and can be criticised in this respect. More widely, a means of overcoming such 
difficulties when investigating the self is to use a wide range of study designs.  
4.3.4. Mixed modalities. This study sought to investigate the concept of self as 
it relates to psychotherapy within an ACT framework. By doing so, it immediately 
invoked a number of limitations and weaknesses. Firstly, the topic of identity is vast, 
complex and at times incoherent (Howard, 2005). To avoid confusion and over-
complexity, the scope of identity in this context had to be necessarily limited, thus 
arguably a poor representation of the overall literature. Secondly, it sought to use 
constructs from outside ACT to test its hypotheses. This introduced the risk of 
conceptual slippage between different traditions, resulting in inaccuracy and lack of 
validity.  
Moreover, synthesising across different modalities meant that their concepts and 
theories were used broadly, emphasising their essential elements so that they could 
be weaved together. Such generality ran the risk of glossing over subtler nuances 
and differentiations between approaches. For instance, matters of internal cause and 
motivations from a cognitive theory (e.g. reactance) are questionable from a 
behavioural perspective, which locates causes outside of the person (Hayes et al., 
1999). To help overcome this potential problem attempts were made to ground the 
study in ACT, which benefits from thorough philosophical and empirical roots. 
4.3.5. Post-modern critique. Rogers (1958) depicts this process conception of 
psychotherapy as a universal model, a common process that anyone undergoing 
therapy anywhere may experience at some level. ACT also appears to indicate that 
a movement from self-as-concept to self-as-context would be universal. Post-
modernist perspectives, supported by cross-cultural research, would assert that the 
process of therapy, even the notion of therapy itself, is contingent and culturally 
bound (Kirmayer, 2007). 
 
0910, C85RES, Research Project Report, UofN:4092614, UoL:08127520, Page 96 of 122 
 
 
There is evidence to suggest cultural variations in the extent to which people identify 
themselves with a sense of self-as-content varies globally. Proulx and Chandler 
(2007) compared the view of 46 Canadian students of Western European ancestry 
with 44 students from Japan, of Japanese ancestry. They found that the Japanese 
students were more likely to judge themselves and others as dis-unified than the 
Canadians. That is, as multiple selves held together only by a single body. They 
were also significantly more likely to think of themselves and others in terms of a 
singular, volitional process of self-growth, where diverse behaviours are bound 
together not by a fixed self-concept, but by the wish to attain common goal. 
Canadians, meanwhile, were most likely to think of themselves as ―highly 
differentiated self-concept[s]‖ (Proulx & Chandler, 2007; p.13). In other words, single 
entities which housed diverse behaviours, triggered by environmental factors. This 
suggests that the Canadian students were more liable to explain self-unity through 
identification with self-as-content than Japanese students, who used other means. 
 
These findings are consistent with earlier ones (e.g. Chandler, Lalonde, Sakol & 
Hallett, 2003), and Kirmayer‘s (1997) argument that self-understandings, such as 
those recruited by psychotherapeutic models, are based upon cultural concepts. 
Similarly, Lewis (1992) reports sociological research contrasting the Western ‗I-self‘ 
with the Japanese or Indian ‗we-self.‘ Overall, cross-cultural studies emphasise that 
alternate means of achieving a persistent sense of self is possible, meaning that 
fusion with self-as-content is neither unvarying nor inevitable.  This suggests a post-
modern riposte to any attempts to identity universal themes of therapeutic change.  
However, Lewis (1992) also distinguishes between these culturally bounded 
differences in individualised self-as-content from consciousness, the capacity for 
self-reflection that is universally human, irrespective of culture. ACT also appears 
consistent with the notion that self-as-context is a universal facet of human 
experience, where self-as-content is shaped and moulded by contingent cultural 
context (Hayes et al, 1999). However, ACT‘s a-ontological stance means that it does 
not delve into these issues unless pragmatically useful (Hayes, 1984; Pepper, 194).  
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4.4. Critique of strengths.   
As much of the thesis has been taken up with emphasising the need and strength of 
the current research, this section is briefer than 4.3. However, it will attempt to give a 
broader critique of why research into self and psychotherapy is important, especially 
from a behaviouralist perspective. 
The therapeutic relevance of fairly abstract discussions identity may not be 
immediately clear. In response, Kirmayer (2007) asserts that the very practise of 
psychotherapy is distinguished by its explicit emphasis on the self. Every system of 
psychotherapy, he writes, implicitly depends upon a model of the self. Similarly, the 
meta-ability of therapist and client to reflect on their self-understandings, (―the 
capacity of a self to know it knows‖, is crucial (Lewis, 1992; p.124). Lewis (1992) 
equates this essential skill for psychotherapy with the very definition of ‗self.‘ Howard 
(2005) states that the concepts and tacit understandings regarding identity are 
central not just to counselling, but also daily life. They are especially influential when 
left unspoken and unaddressed. Therefore, addressing this issue is important from a 
therapeutic point of view. 
It is even more important considering the confusion around self-theorising. Kanter et 
al. (2001) counted 37 separate self-theories in a book chapter reviewing social and 
personality approaches to the self (Robins, Noreem & Cheek, 1999). They suggest a 
reason for this proliferation to be that these theories are built upon ‗real-self‘ 
assumptions. They contrast this with a behavioural approach to self, which does not 
make these assumptions. It offers, they suggest, ―a new vantage point that might 
clarify the confusion‖ (p.199). As the current study is an empirical investigation into 
one of these behavioural approaches to the self, it may be considered as being 
situated in line with this vantage point. Therefore not only is the study of the self in 
psychotherapy of high clinical relevant, but it may be especially important from a 
behavioural point of view, as discussed in 4.5.3. 
4.5. Recommendations for future research 
4.5.1. Alternative variables. Section 4.3.2. highlighted the complexity of the 
self that the present research fails to capture. To address this limitation a number of 
variables will now be summarised. The inclusion of these into future research would 
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improve sensitivity to the complex and multi-faceted nature of identity. In terms of 
variables which the current study has not accounted for, examples would be: (i) the 
extent to which individuals are motivated to maintain self-continuity compared to 
other motives such as self-esteem, meaning or distinctiveness (as measured by 
Vignoles et al., 2006), (ii) locus of control, Dowd et al. (1991) finding an internal locus 
to be necessary for reactance, and (iii) the extent to which individuals believe in a 
fixed ‗essence,‘ which signifies a resistance to identity change (Haslam, Bastian, 
Bain & Kashima, 2006; Pehrson et al., 2009). As well as these variables, it may also 
be worth considering other forms of identity resistance as well as reactance. This 
may be investigated within the diathesis-stress model proposed in 1.5 In short; the 
current study identified general themes, but the complexity of the construct of self 
means that these themes are limited and reductionist if other factors are not 
considered. Moreover, this study picks out and investigates one ACT process 
amongst six. A natural extension is to find out how these processes are interrelated, 
increasing the scope of the current findings. 
4.5.2. Variety of research designs. Section 4.3.4. highlighted that direct 
access to the self is impossible through pencil and paper based studies such as the 
current one. All research methodologies have their own unique pattern of strengths 
and weaknesses in studying the self. Therefore a variety needs to be used so that 
the differing weakness of each methodology can be corrected for by the others. 
Some proposed types of study with existing evidence are summarised.  
4.5.2.1. Experimental designs. Experimental behavioural-based studies 
would lend a different type of support (Kanter et al., 2001). Not only would they 
discern discrepancies between how people actually behave and how they report to 
behave, they would be able to identify causal relationships between the elements of 
self-as-content found to correlate in the present study. This would overcome another 
limitation of the current findings, as no causal mechanisms can be inferred.  
4.5.2.2. Neuro-imaging. Neuro-imaging studies are proving useful in gaining 
insight into the self. For instance, Farb et al. (2007) used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure the monitoring of self-across-time (related to 
self-as-content) and present moment awareness (self-as-context) in participants who 
had completed an 8-week mindfulness course and those who had not. They found 
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that these two distinct forms of self-awareness are habitually integrated but can be 
dissociated through mindfulness training, so that self-across-time is reduced, and 
present moment awareness increased. Relating mindfulness to the self and 
psychotherapy, these findings suggest such practices reduce the need for defensive 
reactance, loosen rigidity of self-concept and increase the ability to connect to the 
present moment – a necessary condition for psychological flexibility.  
4.5.2.3. Qualitative designs. At the other end of the spectrum, qualitative 
studies could provide another type of evidence. Higginson and Mansell‘s (2008) 
analysis of six individual‘s experience of psychological change, for instance, found 
four superordinate themes. One of these was that a former sense of self was lost in 
the process. This would corroborate the current study‘s quantitative support for 
ACT‘s theory that the client‘s fusion to their problematic self-as-content reduces 
during the course of therapy. 
4.5.2.4. Summary. In summary, using a wide range of experimental designs 
when studying the self and psychotherapy would establish a broader range of 
support as each type alone, the present study being an example, is necessarily 
limited. 
4.5.3. Psychotherapy and the behavioural self. The experience of self in 
behaviourism is a surprising and important one, according to Kanter, Parker and 
Kohlenberg, (2001). They explain that behaviourism does not deny the existence of 
private experiences (e.g. the experience of personal identity), but does deny that 
these are entities that exist over and above experiences. Similarly, Hayes (1995) 
talks of selves as verbs: self as experience of reflective self-knowing; rather than self 
as an object existing distinctly from the ongoing process of knowing. Thus, the self 
exists in an ontologically different way to observable physical behaviour.  
4.5.3.1. Alignment with wider academia. This position aligns behaviourism 
with ‗illusory self‘ accounts of personal identity and consciousness within 
neuroscience and philosophy literature (Blackmore, 1999). Beyond brain, body and 
interrelated mental and physical states there is no ‗extra‘ thing to which the 
experience of consciousness coheres. Thus, a person exists in the same way that a 
nation, a club or political party exists: there are interrelated constantly changing 
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context, mental and physical phenomena composing them; there is no further ‗thing‘ 
to which nation or club relates to (Stone, 1988). David Hume (quoted in Perry, 1975; 
p.163) concluded that ―man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions which 
succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and 
movement.‖ That is, the perception of an unchanging self arises from constant and 
imperceptible change. 
Blackmore (1999) suggests that ‗illusory self‘ theories are juxtaposed with ‗real self‘ 
theories such as Cartesian Dualism. These view the self as a persistent entity that 
continues over the course of a lifetime. It is separate from the brain, body or world, 
and is the entity which makes decisions and ‗has‘ experiences, thoughts, memories, 
etc. An illusory theory does not deny this sensation exists, but denies that there is a 
separately existing entity responsible for it. ACT, positioning itself as an a-ontological 
theory, does not need to hold a position on this debate. What ACT would take a 
strong position on is to emphasise that self-as-content is an example of illusory self; 
believing it to be ‗real self‘ can result in psychological inflexibility and distress. Being 
fooled by this illusion is at the heart of ACT (Hayes et al., 1999). 
4.5.3.2. Ethical considerations. These considerations around identity pose 
interesting questions of ACT. It appears, theoretically, to be aligned with modern 
scientific and philosophical arguments regarding the self. However, these arguments 
have an ontological stance, whereas ACT is guided by an a-ontological position. 
Rather than seeking to find what coheres with reality, it seeks whatever is useful 
(discussed further in 4.6). This begs the question, what if it is useful to align with an 
ontological position? Aligning with neuroscience and philosophy in denying the 
existence of a separately existing self would help distinguish self-as-content from 
self-as-context, reducing the danger of fusion with self-as-content. 
However, this ontological position may be considered unethical within a therapeutic 
context. In line with the Anglo-American tradition in which it is bounded (Kirmayer, 
2007) ACT promotes the client‘s right to pursue their own personally chosen values. 
ACT only offers a means of helping the client achieve these ends, not a definition 
what they are (Cloud, 2009; Luoma et al., 2006). The client‘s values may involve 
religious beliefs, or belief in a soul or spirit (Keller, 2005; Medin, 1989; Verkuyten, 
2003, 2005). These would be ontological beliefs that would contradict ACT were it to 
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take an ontological position regarding identity. This would present a lack of toleration 
for the client‘s beliefs. Therefore ethical considerations suggest ACT should maintain 
an a-ontological position on the issue of the self. Within this critique further 
discussion of ethical issues can be found in Extended Methods 2.3. 
4.5.3.3. Summary. In sum, it is clear that the issues around identity which the 
behaviourist approach strikes at have deep roots, and connect to much broader 
areas of study into human experience. However, within the context of psychotherapy 
ethical considerations suggest that ACT maintain an a-ontological stance in this area 
in order to not curtail the freedom of clients to choose their personal values, or 
compromise ACT‘s function as a means of aiding the pursuit of these values. 
4.6. Philosophical foundations  
4.6.1. Functional contextualism. ACT places great importance on 
philosophical foundations, Hayes et al. (1999) pointing out that any theory is based 
upon certain pre-analytic assumptions, and to not acknowledge these assumptions 
would to be unaware of the bias inherent within the theory. Accordingly, it is based 
upon a position known as functional contextualism (FC), drawn from Pepper‘s (1942) 
characterisation of four types of world view. FC takes basic unit of analysis is the 
ongoing act in context: this is the event as a verb, in the process of being done. FC 
draws upon three core elements in the analysis of this unit. 
Firstly, FC seeks to understand the whole event. This is to look at people as 
integrated organisms interacting with the temporal and spatial context in which they 
derive and create, rather than sectioning off or reducing them down to different parts. 
Secondly, FC recognises the importance of context. Events cannot exist or be 
understood if they are divorced from the context in which they take place. This 
context, if we keep identifying it, would radiate out from the event to all other events 
in existence. Therefore, context is delimited and defined by the purposes of the 
individual considering it. Thirdly, FC holds that something is true only if it has a utility 
or function. This is the ‗pragmatic truth criterion‘ (Gifford & Hayes, 1999). For 
instance, if an analysis leads to a valued goal or some effective and beneficial 
behaviour then it may be deemed ‗true.‘ This position is related to the pragmatic 
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approach of William James: ―instead of looking from where an idea is derived, or 
what are its principles, pragmatism examines its results‖ (Durant, 1961, p.512).   
4.6.2. Pragmatic Truth Criterion. The pragmatic truth criterion leads to an a-
ontological stance. This can be illustrated with the present matter of the self in ACT. 
Regarding identity, philosophers use logic in an attempt to discern the metaphysical 
truth of self-as-context – whether it persists through time because it is a separately 
existing entity, or because it is an illusion constructed by the constant activity of brain, 
body and environment (see Section 4.5). ACT‘s interest in self-as-context meanwhile, 
is purely pragmatic. It is interested in self-as-context insofar as it is useful in the 
alleviation of psychological distress. Therefore what it is extremely concerned about 
is that people do not take this underlying sense of being an enduring entity as self-
as-content. This is of the very upmost importance as such confusion can lead to 
psychological distress and resistance to its alleviation. To fulfil the pragmatic truth 
criterion, FC looks to predict and influence events with precision, depth and scope. 
Therefore the matter of the self should be studied as long as it proves a useful 
means of therapeutic innovation. 
4.6.3. Summary. Stating ACT‘s philosophical foundations and relating them to 
an aspect of the current study suggests that ACT‘s philosophical roots reach 
upwards to influence its clinical practise and empirical investigation. 
 
Thesis word count: 24,504 (excluding references).
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Apendix A. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology – Information for authors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All submissions must be made electronically (preferably in MSWord format) to 
Thomas E. Joiner at joiner@psy.fsu.edu. Electronic submissions should include all 
figures and tables in the article file itself, not as separately attached files. Only 
original articles will be considered. Articles should not exceed 10,000 words (text and 
references). Exceptions may be made for reports of multiple studies. 
 
Authors desiring an anonymous review should request this in the submission letter. 
In such cases identifying information about the authors and their affiliations should 
appear only on a cover page. 
Tables should be numbered and referred to by number in the text. Each table is to 
be typed on a separate sheet of paper. 
List references alphabetically at the end of the paper and refer to them in the text 
by name and year in parentheses. 
Authors may consult the publication manual of the American Psychological 
Association, 5th Edition (2002), for rules on format and style. All research papers 
submitted to the JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY must 
conform to the ethical standards of the American Psychological Association. Articles 
should be written in nonsexist language. 
 
Contributors are responsible for obtaining permission from copyright owners if they 
use an illustration, table, or lengthy quote (100+ words) that has been published 
elsewhere. Contributors should write both the publisher and author of such material, 
requesting nonexclusive world rights in all languages for use in the article and in all 
future editions of it. 
 
The JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY is devoted to the 
application of theory and research from social psychology toward the better 
understanding of human adaptation and adjustment, including both the alleviation of  
psychological problems and distress (e.g., psychopathology) and the enhancement of  
psychological well-being among the psychologically healthy. Topics of interest include 
(but are not limited to) traditionally defined psychopathology (e.g., depression),  
common emotional and behavioral problems in l iving (e.g., conflicts in close 
relationships), the enhancement of subjective well -being, and the processes of 
psychological change in everyday life (e.g., self-regulation) and professional settings 
(e.g., psychotherapy and counseling). Articles reporting the results of theory-driven 
empirical research are given priority, but theoretical articles, review articles, clinical  
case studies, and essays on professional issues are also welcome. Articles describing the 
development of new scales (personality or otherwise) or the revision of existing scales 
are not appropriate for this journal. 
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Appendix B. Copy of Questionnaire (adapted from website form) 
 
Psychology Questionnaire 
Hello, thanks for thinking about supporting this study, which is part of a Doctorate qualification in 
Clinical Psychology. This Doctorate is provided by The Institute of Work, Health and Organisations at 
the University of Nottingham.  
We would really appreciate it if you completed our questionnaire, which will appear if you agree to 
the information on this page.  
The questionnaire will ask for your views on a range of topics, such as how you feel about certain 
situations and about yourself. There's no need to agonise over what the 'correct' answer might be, 
simply go with how you feel and your initial reactions. In total, the questionnaire should take less 
than ten minutes to complete.  
When you have finished, you will be reminded of our contact details, which are:  
lwxrjn@nottingham.ac.uk  
Kerry.Beckley@LPFT.nhs.uk  
We would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.  
Before we begin, please confirm that...  
1. ...you are at least 18 years old  
2. ...you provide your consent to take part in this study, understanding that you are free to 
discontinue at any point, and that any information you give will be anonymous and held securely. 
Demographic information. 
1. How old are you?  
2. Are you male or female? 
3. Where were you born?  
4. How would you describe your ethnicity?  
5. What are your religious beliefs? 
Using the scale provided, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of 
the following statements by choosing the option that most closely corresponds with your opinion.  
(SCALE: strongly agree/agree/mostly agree/mostly disagree/disagree/strongly disagree) 
1. The kind of person you are, is something very basic about you and it can't be changed very much.  
2. You can do things differently, but the important parts of who you are can't really be changed.  
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3. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your basic characteristics.  
4. As much as I hate to admit it, you can't teach an old dog new tricks. You can't really change your 
deepest attributes.  
5. You can always substantially change the kind of person you are.  
6. You are a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change that.  
7. No matter what kind of person you are, you can always change very much.  
8. You can change even your most basic qualities. 
Again, please use the scale to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by choosing the option that most closely corresponds to your opinion. Please 
note that this is a different scale to the one used with the previous set of questions.  
(SCALE: strongly disagree/disagree/agree/strongly agree) 
1. If I receive a lukewarm dish at a restaurant, I make an attempt to let that be known.  
2. I resent authority figures who try to tell me what to do.  
3. I find that I often have to question authority.  
4. I enjoy seeing someone else do something that neither of us is supposed to do.  
5. I have a strong desire to maintain my personal freedom.  
6. I enjoying playing "devil's advocate' whenever I can.  
7. In discussions, I am easily persuaded by others.  
8. Nothing turns me on as much as a good argument!  
9. It would be better to have more freedom to do what I want on a job.  
10. If I am told what to do, I often do the opposite.  
11. I am sometimes afraid to disagree with others. 
12. It really bothers me when police officers tell people what to do.  
13. It does upset me to change my plans because someone in the group wants to do something else.  
14. I don't mind other people telling me what to do.  
15. I enjoy debates with other people.  
16. If someone asks a favour of me, I will think twice about what this person is really after.  
17. I am not very tolerant of others' attempts to persuade me.  
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18. I often follow the suggestions of others  
19. I am relatively opinionated  
20. It is important to me to be in a powerful position relative to others.  
21. I am very open to solutions to my problems from others.  
22. I enjoy "showing up" people who think they are right.  
23. I consider myself more competitive than cooperative.  
24. I don't mind doing something for someone even when I don't know why I'm doing it.  
25. I usually go along with other's advice.  
26. I feel it is better to stand up for what I believe than to be silent.  
27. I am very stubborn and set in my ways.  
28. It is very important for me to get along well with the people I work with. 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by 
choosing an option in the scale provided under each section. Again, this is a different scale to the 
one you used in the previous section.  
(SCALE: never true/very seldom true/seldom true/sometimes true/frequently true/almost always 
true/always true) 
1. It's OK if I remember something unpleasant.  
2. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I would value.  
3. I'm afraid of my feelings  
4. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings.  
5. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life.  
6. I am in control of my life.  
7. Emotions cause problems in my life.  
8. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am.  
9. Worries get in the way of my success 
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Appendix D. Publicity Poster for study 
 
Included overleaf
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    Trent Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 Research Project 
Would you volunteer to help with psychology research? 
Yes!  …by filling in a ten-minute questionnaire…  
Yes! …get to the questionnaire with the web address on the tear-off strips 
below…  
 
 
 
 
 
 
What will you be asked to do? 
We will ask for your views on a range of topics, how you feel about certain 
situations and yourself.  
If you would like to know more, contact us on: lwxrjn@nottingham.ac.uk or 
Kerry.Beckley@LPFT.nhs.uk  
Why would you do it? 
You could support and give your voice to a locally based idea that might 
become pubished – its up to you! 
Please tear off one of these strips below: 
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